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1“JUDICIAL NATIONALISM” IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
NATIONAL IDENTITY AND JUDICIAL AUTONOMY AT THE ICJ
Adam M. Smith*
PART I:  INTRODUCTION
While most States have come to view judicial independence vital to the 
dispensation of justice in the domestic sphere,1 States do not have the same expectations 
of detached jurisprudence when facing disputes under international law.  In fact, while a 
judge associated with a party to a domestic suit may be required by municipal law to 
recuse herself,2 in “international adjudication…[it has been assumed that] each State in 
*
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1
 While it is true that the definition of judicial independence varies culturally, and that the standards for 
independence differ among common law and civil law States (see below), the basic premise has found 
widespread, cross-cultural support.   Cf. C.G. Weeramantry, ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE: INTERNATIONAL 
PERSPECTIVE (1988), J. Widner, International and Comparative Law: Who Cares About Courts? Creating 
a Constituency for Judicial Independence in Africa, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1622-1634 (2003). Mark 
Ramseyer, The Puzzling (In)dependence of Courts: A Comparative Approach, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 721, 747.  
(1994).  Ramseyer quotes the American Bar Association’s canon, stressing that in the United States, “[a]n 
independent…judiciary is indispensable to justice in our society.”  Further, though Ramseyer problematizes 
the concept of “judicial independence” he posits that most scholars see “all freedom-loving nations [being] 
faithful, after their fashion, to the principle of judicial independence.”   In the NGO community, the 
importance of judicial independence to “freedom” and economic growth have made it a cause celebre for 
many.  Cf. Freedom House’s annual “Freedom in the World Survey” includes the independence of the 
judiciary as a prime factor in assessing true freedom and democracy.  (www.freedomhouse.org, last visited 
June 21, 2004); the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Report also incorporates judicial 
independence as a key independent variable correlated with growth. (www.weforum.org, last visited June 
28, 2004).
2 Cf. in the United States: 28 USC §455 mandates that “[a]ny justice…of the United States shall disqualify 
himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.”  In South Africa: the 
Constitutional Court has held that “a judicial officer should not hesitate to recuse herself or himself if there 
are reasonable grounds…for apprehending that the judicial officer…will not be impartial.” President of the 
Republic of South Africa and others v South African Rugby Football Union and others (CCT16/98) 1999 
(4) SA 147; 1999 (7) BCLR 725; [1999] ZACC 9 (4 June 1999); in Australia, the High Court found that a 
judge should be recused if there is a “reasonable apprehension of bias.” Livesey v New South Wales Bar 
Association (1983) 151 CLR 288.  Despite this breadth of international acceptance, as MacKenzie and 
Sands note, “the standards governing judicial independence in common law countries differ markedly from 
the Roman, civil law, and Islamic traditions. The common law approach will often find itself in a minority 
on the international bench.”  Ruth MacKenzie and Phillipe Sands, International Courts and Tribunals and 
the Independence of the International Judge, 44 HARV. INT’L L.J. 271, 275 (2002).   
2the litigation should be permitted to have a judge of its own nationality on the bench.”3
The rationale for this arrangement, and the demands of States that it continues, rests on a 
usually unspoken assumption: States believe that national judges will view fellow 
countrymen with greater sympathy than foreigners.4  Thus, though in almost every 
international forum there are regulations and customs limiting judicial conflicts of 
interest, and adjudicators have regularly removed themselves from proceedings for such 
reasons,5 the vast majority of the fora allow, and even encourage, the existence of a base 
level of partiality which States believe stems from a judge’s nationality.  
3
 Il Ro Suh, Voting Behavior of National Judges in International Courts, 63 AM.J.INT’L L. 224-36, 224 
(1969).  However, in a notable departure from the norm, the “dispute resolution provisions annexed to the 
World Trade Organization Agreement provide in Article 8(3) that “[c]itizens of Members whose 
governments are parties to the dispute…shall not serve on a panel concerned with that dispute, unless the 
parties to the dispute agree otherwise.” Detlev Vagts, The International Legal Profession: A Need for More 
Governance?  90 AM.J.INT’L L. 261, 257, (1996) [hereinafter Need for More Governance?] citing 
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Annex 2 to Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization, opened for signature Apr. 15, 1994, reprinted in ILM 1144, 
1226 (1994).  See below for a discussion of the different trends in judicial independent that exist in the 
private international versus the public international legal realms.
4
 “Sympathy,” in these circumstances, is based on the “assumption…that it is useful for the voice of a State 
party to be heard inside the councils of the judges, that this hearing will assure that its arguments are taken 
seriously and that, where relevant, its national legal system will be understood.”  See Vagts, supra note 3, at 
257.
5 Vagts notes that the history of judicial recusal at the ICJis “extensive,” but because the reasoning of such 
removals is rarely made public, it remains an obscure process.  Still, Vagt’s provides the following brief 
early history of such recusals—or decisions not to recuse—and the rationales behind them:
A judge recused himself from Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. 
Australia) because he had previously chaired a committee of inquiry Arbitral Award of 
31 July 1989 (Guinea-Bissau v. Senegal) because he had served on  the panel that made 
the challenged award. Similarly, Sir Benegal Rau did not sit in the case between Britain 
and Iran involving the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company because he had been a member of the 
Security Council in the early stages of the dispute. Sir Muhammed Zafrullah Khan did 
not sit in the merits part of the South West Africa litigation, apparently because he had 
been appointed an ad hoc judge in that case, although he had never acted in that role. The 
circumstances of his recusal, which reportedly involved personal pressure on him from 
the President of the Court, have been controversial. In the same case, the Court rejected a 
South African attempt to obtain the recusal of Judge Luis Padilla Nervo of Mexico on 
account of his Statements in United Nations debates on South West Africa. Prior contacts 
with Liechtenstein persuaded Sir Hersch Lauterpacht not to sit in the Nottebohm case and 
Judge Philip Jessup similarly withdrew from the Temple of Preah Vihear case because of 
prior consultations. But neither Green Hackworth nor Jules Basdevant felt compelled to 
withdraw from the Morocco case because they had been legal advisers of their respective 
governments during the early stages of the dispute. And Judge Helge Klaestad took part 
3Though the importance of judicial nationality has become visceral for many, its  
near-axiomatic status among States remains curious.  States have by and large failed to 
question the assumption of judicial partiality, presuming that their judges will vote with 
them, and others’ judges will similarly follow their masters.  By concentrating on the 
record of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), this paper contends that while a 
continuing focus on nationality is understandable in the ICJ, the “nationality” bias of 
judges on the Court was never as powerful as claimed by alarmists, and today seems to 
be breaking down even further.
For both critics and supporters of international justice, any existence of national6
judicial allegiance would be important—for the former it would buttress one of its most 
cogent critiques, and for the latter it would prove another hindrance to the development 
of a truly transnational system of law.  Part II of this article proceeds by first briefly 
examining the history of this “judicial nationalism,” and the Permanent Court of 
International Justice’s (1920-1942) and the ICJ’s (1946-Present) tendencies to de facto
and de jure assume national bias among their respective judges.  The statutes, 
institutional structures and practices of both organizations have been fundamentally 
in the Norwegian Fisheries case, although his tenure on the Supreme Court of Norway 
had brought him into contact with the issues that came before the Court.
See Vagts, supra note 3, at 255-6.  Further, the matter of judicial bias has even led to violence on the bench: 
concerns about his putative bias led two Iranian judges on the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal to 
physically attack Judge Mangard, a “neutral” serving on the tribunal.  Charles N. Brower and Jason D. 
Brueschke, THE IRAN-UNITED STATES CLAIMS TRIBUNAL 169 (1998).   
6
 This article leaves aside the issue of regional biases that do or do not exist within the ICJ.  For an analysis 
of the posited Western bias of ICJ decisions, see, Richard Falk, REVIVING THE WORLD COURT (1986).  For 
an argument positing the anti-Western (and in particular anti-United States) bias of the Court, see, W. 
Michael Reisman, W. Michael Reisman, Termination of the United States Declaration Under Article 36(2) 
of the Statute of the International Court, in The United States and The Compulsory Jurisdiction of the 
International Court of Justice, Aug. 1985, at 73. 
4impacted by the belief in judicial allegiance.7  Despite this, Part III will show, via a 
quantitative analysis of the Court’s voting record from its inception through 2000, 
including a cross-tabulation of alliance voting on the body, that the power of nationality 
is indeterminate at best, rarely dispositive, and likely fleeting.  Linking nationality with 
expected voting behavior is an over-simplified and blunt heuristic.  Finally, Part IV looks 
to the future, both normatively and positively.  It examines both why the nationality 
assumption seems to have failed, and how such failure is being implicitly acknowledged 
among States, manifest by the increasing inconsistency with which it is applied in fora 
apart from the ICJ.  In particular, a substantial rift is emerging between public 
international law and private international law in this regard; the most recent regulations 
of the World Trade Organization (WTO) actually prohibit co-nationals from serving on 
arbitrations.8  It is this return to—and mounting importance of—the commercial, non-
State roots of international litigation (when it was conducted solely between commercial 
actors) that is ironically changing the landscape of inter-State disputes.  
Arguably, there remain important components of nationality that ought to be 
recognized.  However, the claim that nationality matters in international jurisprudence, as 
a positive assertion, is so overbroad as to be inaccurate, while the claim that nationality 
should matter in such jurisprudence, as a normative assertion, seems unattractive in 
today’s world.
7 Cf. Shabtai Rosenne, Note and Comment: The Election of Five Members of the International Court of 
Justice in 1981, 76 AM.J.INT’L L. 364; Shabtai Rosenne, Current Development: The Election of March 
1982 to Fill One Vacancy in the International Court of Justice, 76 AM.J.INT’L L. 863.
8
 Vagts, supra note 3, at 261.
5PART II: THE BIRTH OF THE IDEA
A. BRIEF HISTORY
The roots of the practices and beliefs surrounding “judicial nationalism” are 
somewhat murky.9  Ancient Greek law, and in particular Athenian practices, provided for 
formal binding arbitration proceedings which, though allowing parties to choose their 
arbiters, insisted that the judges be neutral.10  Roman law was more restricted, greatly 
limiting party choice in non-judicial litigation: “the…practice of [any] third party, 
helping disputants transact an agreement or compose an accord conflicted with…formal 
Roman law…concepts….”11  Finally, canon law, the root of so much modern legal 
thinking, 12 provides injunctions for reconciliation in order to be at “peace with one’s 
neighbors,”13 but offers little support for doing so via a tribunal composed of judges of 
the parties’ choosing.  In fact, the dispute resolution systems developed by major 
religions uniformly frown on biased arbiters.14
9
 The elucidation of this is made all the more difficult due to the fact that “[For] most of their history, 
arbitral tribunals, unlike the courts, did not rely on and therefore did not produce written records of their 
operation.”  Douglas Yarn, The Death of ADR: A Cautionary Tale of Isomorphism Through 
Institutionalization, 108 PENN ST. L. REV. 929, 938 (2004).
10
 Kaja Harter-Uibopuu, Anthropological and Historical Foundations: Ancient Greek Approaches Toward 
Alternative Dispute Resolution, 10 WILLAMETTE J. INT’L L. & DISPUTE RES. 47 (2002).
11
 Yarn, supra note 9, at 945.
12
 “...religious legal systems have had, and continue to have a monumental influence on the lives and 
institutions of the faithful….They also have had…a pronounced influence on the secular legal systems 
around them.”  Charles J. Reid, Jr. and John Witte, Jr.  Review Essay: In the Steps of Gratian: Writing the 
History of Canon Law in the 1990s.  48 EMORY L.J. 647, 688 (1999).
13
 Earl S. Wolaver, The Historical Background of Commercial Arbitration, 83 U. OF PA. L. R. 132 (1934).
14 Eg. James A. Brundage, MEDIEVAL CANON LAW, 125-26 (1995), discussing the development of courts of 
appeals in the Catholic Church. The most common modality for keeping bias out of such proceedings is via 
ensuring that only spiritual leaders sit on tribunals; the understanding is that the religious judges would 
necessarily be divorced from having any interest in the profane matters brought before them.  By design, 
these religious arbiters provide the interpretation of divine law, with scant human interference between the 
divine provenance of the law and the secular implementation of decisions.   Theoretically there is thus little 
ability to be biased.  Sam Feldman, Reason and Analogy: A Comparison of Early Islamic and Jewish Legal 
Institutions, 2 UCLA J. ISLAMIC & NEAR E.L. 129-154, 130 (2002). Jewish religious courts, Beths Din, are 
somewhat different in that they allow laypeople to serve on tribunal bodies; however, they too demand the 
removal of arbiters if they have specific interests at stake in a proceedings.  See GUIDE TO RULES AND 
6The only clear roots of the practice of party-appointed, non-neutrals is that its 
foundations lie in “conciliatory” or “mediatory” practices,  rather than “adjudicative” 
practices.15  That is, having a party-appointed judge is historically a practice of arbitration 
not litigation.  Though shades of the practice were present in various fora, this ability to 
name arbitrators appeared first most clearly and consistently in commercial arbitration.16
Archeological and anthropological evidence exists of very early arbitrations conducted 
between individuals in “highly interdependent communities” in England and Continental 
Europe in pre-Norman times.  In such communities, the divisiveness of legal proceedings 
and the entrenchment of such divisions often remaining after judgment, were anathema to 
the close cooperation necessitated by the political economy of pre-Norman sustenance 
agriculture.  Consequently, in order to ensure a conciliatory and convivial environment, 
disputants shied away from State involvement, preferring for civil society-based 
resolution of disagreements.  The tradition of party-appointed arbitrators was thought to 
not only engender compromise, but also clearly separated the process from State 
mandate.17
This tradition was carried forward into the world of parish and commercial guilds 
during Medieval times, in which extrajudicial dispute resolution was found “more 
convenient…and more profitable, than [the] process and rigour of the law.”18  The ability 
for each party to name judges was critical to their agreeing to keep the dispute within the 
PROCEDURE OF THE BETH DIN OF AMERICA, June 1997 Version.  Available at: 
http://www.bethdin.org/rules.htm (last visited October 31, 2004).
15
 Yarn, supra note 9, at 932.
16 See Soia Mentschikoff, Commercial Arbitration, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 846, 854-56 (1961). But see Earl S. 
Wolaver, The Historical Background of Commercial Arbitration, 83 U. PENN. L. REV. 132 (1934-35) 
(finding no evidence of arbitration among the commercial communities of England’s medieval period).
17
 These third parties were often “friends” of the disputants.  Daniel E. Murray, Arbitration in the Anglo-
Saxon and Early Norman Periods, 16 ARB. J. 193, 196 (1961).
18
 Yarn, supra note 9, at 941
7guild and outside the State system.    This, in turn, served guilds’ purposes of buttressing 
their own power at the expense of formal legal institutions which often worked against 
expanding arbitration.19
Though State judicial organs often bridled at the expansion of arbitration, States 
were not entirely averse to these developments.  The early importance of commercial 
efficiency led to the appearance of legislative provisions for arbitrations as early as the 
Anglo-Norman period20 and into Medieval times,21 with many systems allowing for a 
modicum of control by the parties over the composition of the panel.22  International 
commerce grew more quickly than international law, which made the model of non-law 
litigation especially useful when conflicts arose between two entities from different 
jurisdictions.  In these cases it became evident that “while speed, informality, and 
economy have had some influence on the growth of international commercial arbitration, 
the essential driving force has been the desire of each party to avoid having its case 
determined in a foreign judicial forum.”23  In such cases it made sense “for parties 
to…refer their disputes to a mutually acceptable… decisionmaker.”24  This requirement 
19 Id., at 974.
20 Id., at 943.
21 The History of Arbitration in Sweden, on the website of the ARBITRATION INSTITUTE OF THE STOCKHOLM 
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE (http://www.sccinstitute.com/uk/About/The_history_of_arbitration_in_Sweden 
(last visited Nov 2, 2004)).  Some historians claim that the trade guilds in 12th Century England were an 
even earlier incarnation of legislatively mandated arbitral bodies.  However, their nature as bodies of 
mandatory jurisdiction make them seem more akin to aspects of the English judicial system than true 
examples of arbitration.  See Earl Wolaver, The Historical Background of Commercial Arbitration, 83 U. 
PA. L. REV. 132, 135-36 (1934).    
22
 In 1698 English Merchants were provided implicit power to accept arbiters—in that they had to the 
power to  refuse to submit their suits to “arbitration…or umpirage.” ACT FOR DETERMINING DIFFERENCES 
BY ARBITRATION, 9 William III, c. 15 (1698).  An 1854 act provided more explicit rights stating that 
matters referred by a court to arbitration are to be taken up—in first instance—by “an Arbitrator appointed 
by the Parties…”  COMMON LAW PROCEDURE ACT, 17 and 18 Victoria, c. 125 (1854).
23
 W. Laurence Craig, Some Trends and Developments in the Laws and Practice of International 
Commercial Arbitration, 30 TEX. INT’L L.J. 1, 2 (1995).
24
 Paul H. Haagen, New Wineskins for New Wine: The Need To Encourage Fairness in Mandatory 
Arbitration, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 1039, 1052 (1998).
8of “mutual acceptability” of the decisionmaker moved arbitration decidedly out of a 
purely legal realm—in which the ability for parties to choose judges and fora is severely 
constrained25—into a much looser “quasi-legal” arena in which parties have a great 
degree of control in determining the contours and methodology of tribunals to which they 
put disputes.26
The move from arbitration as a commercial endeavor, to arbitration involving 
States was first formalized in the Jay Treaty of 1794, between the United States and 
Britain.27  Article Five of the Treaty, describing the establishment of an arbitral body to 
settle certain disputes that remained following the American Revolution, appears to adopt 
the idea of party-appointed arbitrators as a matter of course:  
25
 Historically, civil systems, operating under the principle of “party autonomy,” and have provided 
litigants much greater freedom of such choices than have common law systems.  See Larry Kramer, 
Rethinking Choice of Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 277, 330-31 (1990); E. Rabel, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS: A 
COMPARATIVE STUDY, 359-431 (2d ed. 1960). However, neither provide for the almost unlimited flexibility 
of modern arbitration processes.  Depending upon the arbitral system used, this flexibility can extend to 
judge, forum, procedure and even law—with parties able to stipulate rules that do not derive from national 
law.  Historically, there were only minimal requirements necessary for arbitration, and in modern 
proceedings parties have a wide degree of freedom in designing arbitration clauses, and still gain State 
enforcement of such decisions.  For example, see the International Chamber of Commerce, RULES OF 
CONCILIATION AND ARBITRATION, art. 13(3) which states:  “The parties shall be free to determine the law 
to be applied by the arbitrator to the merits of the dispute. In the absence of any indication by the parties as 
to the applicable law, the arbitrator shall apply the law designated as the proper law by the rule of conflict 
which he deems appropriate.”  Some systems, however, such as those under ICSID control, have 
jurisdictional requirements.  AMAZU ASOUZO, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND AFRICAN 
STATES 262 (2001).   
26
 Parties could usually even opt out of arbitration proceedings as in many early English contracts such 
clauses were revocable.  See Wolaver, supra note 13, at 138.  The “quasi-judicial” aspects of arbitration 
concerned common law lawyers and judges who worried about arbitration as a means to supplant their 
roles.  This explains, in some measure, why common law courts were originally so hostile to arbitration, as 
the practice limited the ability of the courts to establish/institutionalize their powers and also ate into their 
“case-based” salaries.
27
 Srecko Vidmar, Compulsory Inter-state Arbitration of Territorial Disputes, 31 DENV. J. INT’L L. & 
POL’Y 87, 91 (2002); J. L. Simpson and Hazel Fox, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: LAW AND PRACTICE 1 
(1959); JACKSON H. RALSTON, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION FROM ATHENS TO LOCARNO 191 (1929).  See 
also  INT’L COURT OF JUSTICE, “BLUEBOOK”—HISTORY OF THE COURT (1946-1996) “HISTORY” SECTION 
(1996), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/igeneralinformation/ibbook/Bbookframepage.htm.
9One [arbitrator]…shall be named by His Majesty, and one by the 
President of the United States,…and the said two Commissioners 
shall agree on the choice of a [neutral] third….28
Article Five provided no further details as to who should be chosen to serve on 
the Commission, allowing the States free reign.  This allowance of complete freedom of 
choice in arbiters was new to inter-State arbitrations. Though historians can trace ad hoc 
inter-State arbitral proceedings to antiquity,29 the only evidence of States or other public 
entities having any ability to choose arbiters was when they were choosing among 
avowedly neutral judges.30  It appears that the tradition of permitting States to select 
openly partial judges in inter-State disputes was only adopted after essentially 
commercial arbitration practices became the means of choice for settling public, inter-
State disagreements.           
As inter-State disputes like those covered in the Jay Treaty31 migrated from 
arbitration to the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) and then the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ), the new “judicial” institutions inherited32 “judicial 
28 THE TREATY OF AMITY, COMMERCE AND NAVIGATION (THE JAY TREATY), signed at London, Nov 19, 
1794.  Available at: http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/diplomacy/britian/jay.htm (last visited Nov 2, 
2004).  Interestingly, in analyzing all historical cases of inter-state arbitration prior to the Jay Treaty, 
29
 Such inter-State arbitrations were a staple of early-Hellenic history.  Famous arbitrations include the 600 
BC dispute between Athens and Megara over the possession of Salamis—which was decided by a panel of 
five Spartan arbitrators, the 480 BC controversy between Corinth and Corcyra over Leucas and the 117 BC 
dispute over boundary lines between the Genoese and Viturians which was also submitted to arbitration.   
Frank D. Emerson, History of Arbitration Practice and Law, 19 CLEV. ST. L. R. 155, 156 (1970) and
GREGORY NAGY, PINDAR’S HOMER Chapter 11 (1997).
30
 For instance, the 5 BC treaty between Sparta and Argos, provided:
If there should arise a difference…there shall be an arbitration….[The] dispute will be brought 
before a neutral town chosen by common agreement. Ralston, supra note 27, at 147 (quoting 
Thucydides, emphasis added).
31
 A key component of the issues dealt with under arbitration were territorial disputes unresolved by the 
Revolutionary War.  Such disputes have since become the most common case presented before the 
PCIJ/ICJ.  See Jay Treaty, supra note 28, and the Decisions of the International Court of Justice.
32
 This inheritance was most clearly transmitted via the 1920 Committee of Jurists (involved in the 
establishment of the PCIJ) which “put its decision to permit participation by judges of the nationality of the 
parties on the ground that this would protect the character of the Court as a World Court, and would ‘avoid 
10
nationalism” and some of the other “quasi-legal” aspects of arbitration.33  It was this 
unwitting cohering of law and arbitration that led to judicial nationalism being seen both 
as an “obvious” component in international litigation and as an affront to the notion of 
“legalism.”34  Yet, despite the concerns of some that allowing party-appointed judges on 
a court would debase the rule of law,35 States would come to require it.  As one observer 
put the issue: “Why…is a judge permitted to participate when his government is a party? 
Because States…would have it no other way.”36
Once States entered the fray officially, the necessities of international prestige 
(especially for new States like the United States and recently weakened states like 
Britain) made it evident that their appointees, as an initial requirement, would be chosen 
on the basis of nationality.  Indeed, it quickly was recognized that “the success of an 
arbitral panel largely [depended] on the ability of [these partisan] arbitrators to reach an 
agreement without recourse to the neutral member of the panel.”37  In the early nineteenth 
century, it was not uncommon for States to ignore arbitral findings when such panels did
not have State representation.38
ruffling national susceptibilities’…”  MANLEY HUDSON, THE PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL 
JUSTICE, 1920-1942 354-355 (1943).
33
 The arbitration-like components brought into international law included entirely consensual jurisdiction, 
a sense that the international judge—like an arbitrator—”is not entitled to do anything unauthorized by the 
parties,” and consequently “a purported award which is accomplished in ways inconsistent with the shared 
contractual expectations of the parties is something to which they had not agreed…[and]… may be ignored 
by the ‘losing’ party.”  W. Michael Reisman, The Breakdown of the Control Mechanism in ICSID 
Arbitration, 1989 DUKE L.J. 739, 745 (1989).
34
 Evidence for this contention also comes from the fact that States have maintained their right to appoint 
arbitrators in inter-State disputes they submit to arbitration, rather than the ICJ.  See PERMANENT COURT OF 
ARBITRATION OPTIONAL RULES FOR ARBITRATING DISPUTES BETWEEN TWO STATES, Article 6-8.  
35 Proces-Verbaux of the Proceedings of the Advisory Committee of Jurists, 24th Meeting, 14 July 1920, pp. 
528-529.
36 William Samore, World Court Statute and the Impartiality of the Judges, 34 NEB. L. REV. 618, 628 
(1955).
37
 Vidmar, supra note 27, at 92.
38
 As occurred in a territorial arbitration following the War of 1812, in which the United States chose not to 
accept the arbitral determination of a panel absent United States representation.  Id.
11
Regardless its initial instigation, the trend of judicial nationalism born from the 
Jay Treaty and then the PCIJ has continued unabated across international courts ranging 
from those covering public law questions, such as the International Court of Justice (ICJ), 
to those addressing humanitarian law such as the ad hoc United Nations tribunals in 
Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia (ICTR, ICTY), and the nascent International 
Criminal Court (ICC) to the quasi-judicial human rights treaty bodies.  In almost all 
cases, the vacancy of a seat on any international panel causes States to use whatever 
leverage they can muster in order to assure that one of their own citizens is appointed to 
the post.39  Concerning the ICC, belief in the political importance of judicial nationality is 
also a part of the criticism allayed against the organization; critics are fearful that 
politically-aligned judges will engage in politically-motivated prosecutions.40
39
 The election of State members of the United Nation’s Human Rights Committee has long been a highly 
political/contentious affair, with States often jockeying for votes with the State-electorate and the results of 
the elections frequently criticized.  See Parodie à l’ONU [Parody at the UN], LE MONDE, Apr. 28, 2003, 
U.S. to Demand Vote on Libya’s Leadership of Rights Panel, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2003, at A4.  For 
politics concerning the ICTY judicial selection process, see Judges in Electoral Campaign for Bosnia War 
Crimes Tribunal, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, May 8, 1997; Battle Looms over UN Posts, NIKKEI WEEKLY
(Japan) Jan 25, 1993, page 2.  The 2001 elections to the ICTY were noted for their extreme politicization, 
marked by the “amount of money spent on campaigning, as well as [the fact that] political considerations, 
were reportedly much greater factors in the outcome of the elections than the qualifications of the 
candidates.” M2 PRESSWIRE, August 1, 2002.  Competition can also be within States, such as the domestic 
argument between various parties in the Czech Republic over who should be nominated to the ICTY.  See 
Coalition Leaders Meet First Time This Year, CZECH NEWS AGENCY, Jan 6, 2004.  Such battles have been 
a long part of international tribunals.  In the initial “race” to appoint the first 15 ICJ judges, nearly eighty 
candidates were put forward by member States.  See Sydney Gruson, Three Americans in UNO Court Race, 
NEW YORK TIMES, Jan. 13, 1946, at 2.  
40
 In a 1999 report to the Commission on Human Rights, the Special Rapporteur on the independence of 
judges and lawyers expressed concern that the institutional structure of the ICC undermined judicial 
independence.  See REPORT OF THE SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR ON THE INDEPENDENCE OF JUDGES AND 
LAWYERS (Param Cumaraswamy).  UN Doc. E/CN.4/1999/60, Jan 13, 1999 ¶38-40.  
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B. THE THEORY COMES TO  THE ICJ
Nowhere is the assumption of determinacy via nationality clearer than in the 
charter and operation of the ICJ.  In addition to its “permanent” bench of fifteen judges,41
parties to a dispute are able to appoint additional judges to the bench if they are not 
otherwise represented among the fifteen.42  The existence of these “ad hoc” judges, in 
addition to the assumed partiality of the permanent judges on the bench towards 
protecting their own States’ interests (even if not party to a specific case), has led many 
to bemoan a “fatal lack of rationality” within the Court’s mechanics, and claim that 
national partiality is one of the “most urgent problems of the political organization of the 
international community.”43  Still others have complained that the system corrupts justice 
and impedes the development of international law.  
Though this paper problematizes the assumption of national partiality on the ICJ 
bench, and questions the veracity of its underlying rationale, it is evident why States first 
developed the assumption, and in some senses why they continue to hold fast to it.  The 
assumption fits neatly into the Westphalian model of Statehood, and takes into account 
the uniquely amorphous contours of international law.  Under the Westphalian system the 
State is sacrosanct in the international sphere and consequently the prime mode of 
identification for actors in a multinational context.44  As the Fourth Annual Report of the 
PCIJ argued:
41
 Judges are elected for a period of 9 years; see below for details on the process.
42
 As Schwebel notes, “[I]n the current parlance of the Court, a sitting judge of the nationality of a party to 
the case is called a “national judge.”  Stephen Schwebel, Judges of the International Court of Justice, 48 
INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 889, 891 (1999).
43
 Shabtai Rosenne, Sir Hersch Lauterpacht’s Concept of the International Judge, 55 AM.J.INT’L L. 855-6 
(1961).
44
 Though writers including Grotius, Pufendorf and Hobbes held that individuals, as well as States, were 
subjects under international law, the inability for individuals to gain standing in international legal fora 
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Of all influences to which men are subject, none is more powerful, more 
pervasive, or more subtle, than the tie of allegiance that binds them to the land of 
their homes and kindred and to the great sources of the honors and preferments 
for which they are so ready to spend their fortunes and to risk their lives.45
The importance of this allegiance is magnified in international law due to the fact 
that it is a system without a defined corpus, relying more on custom, the laws of 
“civilized nations” and the teachings of “qualified publicists”46 than on formal “black 
letter law.”  Unlike domestic legal systems (and particularly civil law systems) 
international judicial debate is often as much about whether a law exists (and if so, 
exactly what the law is),47 as it is about how to apply law to a particular case.  
Consequently, when faced with a difficult issue, about which the international legal 
regime is ambiguous, it seems logical that judges would return to their domestic judicial 
roots for guidance, and even err on the side of their States if possible.  
i. Institutional Mechanics and the Potential for Jingoism
Though a provision for national judges exists in various fora in the international 
legal system,48 and concerns about the independence of international judges predate 
(until recently) effectively deprived them of any internationally cognizable status.  See Marek St. 
Korowicz, The Problem of the International Personality of Individuals, 50 AM.J.INT’L L. 533 (1956).
45 Fourth Annual Report of Permanent Court of International Justice, Series E, No. 4, pp. 75-76.  In 
today’s world the ties to one’s home and kin may actually not equate with citizenship (see below); 
however, in the early twentieth century, “land of their homes” was essentially equated with citizenship.
46 STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, at art 38.
47 See Mariano J. Aznar-Gomez, The 1996 Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion and Non-Liquet in 
International Law, 48 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 3 (1999); Prosper Weil, “The Court Cannot Conclude 
Definitively…” Non Liquet Revisited, 36 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 109 (1997).  The existence of lacunae 
in international law, and the motley ways in which the ICJ has filled it in the past (via reference to “equity,” 
for example), means that such gaps are potentially exploitable by nationality-considering judges.
48 Eg. UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON LAW OF THE SEA, art. 2, Annex V, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 
397 (calling for each State party to a dispute to appoint four “conciliators”), STATUTE OF THE INTER-
AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, art. 10, O.A.S. Res. 448 (IX-0/79) (1980) (allowing State parties to 
appoint “ad hoc” national judges to hear specific disputes).  
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international courts,49 it was the statute of the PCIJ that solidified the notion. 50  Article 31 
of the PCIJ statute, written in response to substantial national pressure, and converted 
verbatim into Article 31 of the current court’s statute, provides a right for “[j]udges of the 
nationality of each of the parties…to sit in the case before the Court.”51
Gaining the representation of litigants on the adjudicating panel was a hard fought 
battle during the drafting of the PCIJ statute.  A chief antagonist of the proposal was 
Bernard Loder, who would become the PCIJ’s first president.  He claimed that having a 
co-national as a judge “would give the proceedings a characteristic essentially belong to 
arbitration,” rather than the dispensation of justice.52  However, the pragmatists won the 
day arguing that “if [States] cannot be assured of representation on the Court it will prove 
impossible to obtain their assent.”53  This was a concern for the entire tenure of the 
League of Nations in all of the League’s workings, but it was especially so for the PCIJ 
which saw many of the League’s largest member States balk at consenting to the body.54
As a result, national interest, and the assumption of national bias, was preserved in the 
PCIJ, significantly quelling State objections.   
The expectation of national bias was manifest even more clearly—and with 
substantially less dissent—during the post World War II debates at Dumbarton Oaks and 
then during the San Francisco Treaty Conference (which resulted in the formation of the 
49 FREDERICK DUNN, THE PROTECTION OF NATIONALS: A STUDY IN THE APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW, 106-107 (1932).  Dunn spoke in connection with the mixed claims commissions.  (Quoted in Thomas 
R. Hensley, National Bias and the International Court of Justice, 12 MIDWEST JN’L OF POL. SCI. 568, 569 
(1968)).
50
 At meetings of the Committee of Jurists in 1920 it was argued that, without judges from the Great 
Powers, the Court would be impracticable, and that the people of litigating States would not accept 
decisions of the Court if their countries were not represented.  See PCIJ, Advisory Committee of Jurists, 
Proces-Verbaux of the Proceedings of the Committee, June 16-July 24, 1920, with Annexes, pp. 28-29, 
105, 120, 134.
51 STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, at art. 31.
52 Supra note 36.
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United Nations and some of its sister institutions including its “principal judicial organ,” 
the ICJ).55  A contentious issue in the conference concerned whether ICJ judges ought to 
be “independent” or “impartial”56 with regard to their nationalities.  In the end, the statute 
requires judges to exercise their duties “impartially,” but is silent on whether or not 
judges should be “independent.”57  The subtext is evident: a judge can at once be 
impartial and yet remain non-autonomous.    
In many respects, the process by which ICJ judges are selected supports this view.  
Term judges (those that that do not sit for a single case as ad hoc judges do) are 
nominated by the national groups58 of the Permanent Court of Arbitration, ensuring that 
no State has more than one seat, and that “the persons to be elected should individually 
possess the qualifications required, [and] the body as a whole [should represent]…the 
main forms of civilization and… principal legal systems of the world.”59  Far from being 
independent, the process arguably mandates that judges bring with them the cultural 
preconceptions and biases extant in their national groupings.  Moreover, that the 
developed custom has had the five permanent members60 of the Security Council always 
53 Id., at 638.
54 Cf Edwin L. James, Adopt World Court but with Protest,  NEW YORK TIMES, Dec. 14, 1920, 1.
55 UN CHARTER, Article 7; STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, at art. 1
56 William Samore, National Origins v. Impartial Decisions: A Study of World Court Holdings, 34 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 193 (1956), 197.  The distinction between the two concepts was elucidated in a 1985 report 
by the sub-commission of the Human Rights Commission focusing of judicial administrations.  
“Independence” refers to freedom from any restrictions, inducements, pressures, threats or interference, 
direct or indirect….” (¶ 77)… Impartiality implies freedom from bias, prejudice and partisanship; it means 
not favoring one more than another; it connotes objectivity and an absence of affection or ill-will. To be 
impartial as a judge is to hold the scales even and to adjudicate without fear or favor in order to do right . . 
.”  UN document: E/CN.4/Sub.2/1985/18 and Add. 1-6.  Interestingly, the ICC statute calls for judges to be 
both impartial and independent.  See STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, at art. 40-41.
57 STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, at art. 20.
58
 “National groups” are representatives of States made up of four jurists.  These jurists can propose up to 
five candidates for election.  Provisions are also made for those States not part to the Permanent Court of 
Arbitration to participate in the election process.  Id. at art. 4.
59 Id. at art. 9.
60
 The five permanent Security Council members are: China, France, Russia, United Kingdom and United 
States.
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holding a seat, has insured that the ICJ at least appears to be an as nationally-interested 
body as the Security Council itself.  
Once nominated, the fifteen term judges are then voted upon by the United 
Nations General Assembly and the Security Council for renewable terms of nine years, 
with an election for one-third of the bench held every three years.61  Thus, judges are 
theoretically accountable for their decisions under pain of dismissal by the Assembly and 
Council—both bodies that represent national interests.  While appointments of ad hoc 
jurists are manifestly political and nationally-oriented,62 the result of the system 
mandated in the ICJ statute is that the nominating process and the triennial ICJ judicial 
elections of term judges are highly-political affairs as well.  In each election cycle, the 
General Assembly and the Security Council elect five judges (one-third of the bench) in 
separate, choosing from among a list of nominees chosen by the national groups 
mentioned above.  This, combined with a voting system which allows the possibility for 
more than five judges to receive the requisite majority,63  has historically made the votes 
very contentious.64
61 Id., at art. 13.
62 See HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, THE FUNCTION OF LAW IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY (1933). The 
ICJ is not alone in this regard: See also STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL OF THE LAW OF THE 
SEA, at art. 17 and John E. Noyes, The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, 32 CORNELL INT’L 
L.J. 109 (1998).
63 STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, at arts. 10, 12.  See also, Leo Gross, The 
International Court of Justice: Consideration of Requirements for Enhancing its Role in the International 
Legal Order, 65 AM. J. INT'L L. 253, 291 (1971), W. N. Hogan, The Ammoun Case and the Election of 
Judges to the International Court of Justice, 59 AM. J. INT'L L. 908 (1965).
64
 The ICJ’s first election in 1948 was an indication of how political the judicial appointment process could 
become.  The re-election of Yugoslav judge Milovan Zoricitch required the holding of night sessions for 
both the General Assembly and the Security Council, with the Soviet and Ukrainian electors making clear 
that if Zoricitch were not re-appointed, they would only support the appointment of another Slav to the 
post.  See Five Re-elected to World Court, NEW YORK TIMES, Oct 23, 1948, at 3.
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National interest, and the search for a “safe pair of hands” in which to entrust 
national interests at the Court, are key concerns for States during such elections.65  In 
addition to the technical election process, the process has also come to include formal and 
informal meetings between UN diplomats, with influential States playing a large role in 
the process, cajoling, coaxing and bargaining with other States for their support of 
specific candidates.66  Re-election of judges can even focus on cases that the judge has 
decided.67  Increasingly, and especially evident in the nascent ICC, judicial appointments 
have become an element of domestic political patronage, explicitly rewarding 
national/governmental loyalty and service.68  The more direct the linkage between 
appointment and patronage, and the more prestige associated with remaining on the 
bench once appointed, the greater the potential for the interests of the patron State to play 
a significant role throughout a judge’s tenure.69
65 Id.
66
 “Everything in the United Nations tends to be politicized in the sense that everything, including elections 
to the Court, becomes stakes in the never-ending process of bargaining for whatever is on the market.”  
Gross, supra note 63, at 287.
67 See Mackenzie and Sands, supra note 2, at 278-9. 
68
 The ranks of ICJ judges have historically been full of former government ministers and others close with 
the ruling government.  Among the first 15 to serve were former foreign ministers, justices of supreme 
courts and a president of the national bank.  See Five Re-elected to World Court, supra note 37.  In the 
current court, the trend continues.  For example, Hisashi Owada, the Japanese representative on the court 
was a career diplomat, Japanese ambassador to the United Nations and is also the father of the Crown 
Princess.  ICJ website (www.icj-cij.org; last visited July 10, 2004);. website of the Imperial Household 
Agency (http://www.kunaicho.go.jp/e02/ed02-04.html) (last visited Nov 1, 2004).  Regarding the ICC, 
concerns of such political appointments, and the role of judges in having to approve what could be highly 
politicized decisions to prosecute, have risen the ire of even some of the Court’s prime supporters.  See 
Henry Kissinger, DOES AMERICA NEED A FOREIGN POLICY?: TOWARD A DIPLOMACY FOR THE 21ST 
CENTURY 273 (2001); Allison Marston Danner, Navigating Law and Politics: The Prosecutor of the 
International Criminal Court and the Independent Counsel, 5 STAN. L. REV. 1633 (2003).
69
 This would fit a traditional patron-client relationship, and would elucidate the initial selection, voting and 
reappointment of specific judges.  See generally James C. Scott, Political Clientalism: A Bibliographical 
Essay, in FRIENDS, FOLLOWERS AND FACTIONS 305-323 (S. Schmidt, et al. eds., 1977).  Though analyses of 
these relationships are common in the political science literature, there has been no work specifically on the 
patron-client phenomenon in the international judiciary.  However, it would be reasonable to believe that 
some aspects of this relationship are present, especially among judges from States which have government 
bureaucracies run in accordance with a patron-client model.    
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In addition to judge selection, the operation of the court also provides room for 
national interests to be furthered by the ICJ.  Both the court’s jurisdiction, and the fact 
that it is privy to hear two classes of cases (contentious and advisory), have been 
“nationalized” by some parties.  Turning to jurisdiction, of the 191 members of the UN 
(who are automatically members of the ICJ) only 64 have standing acceptance of ICJ 
jurisdiction.70  The 127 other States have lodged reservations, and allow jurisdiction 
solely on a case-by- case basis.  As the United States v. Nicaragua71 case manifested, the 
provision and withdrawal of jurisdiction inherently politicizes and nationalizes 
proceedings.  That the only judge to support the United States position in the 
jurisdictional phase of that case happened to be the American sitting on the bench, only 
intensified the assumption of judicial bias.72  These jurisdictional machinations 
undertaken by States have been based on the fear that ICJ judges would make nationally-
driven decisions on the merits of a matter if it were allowed to proceed that far.73
A component of the jurisdictional debate also concerns the makeup of the bench 
that hears any specific case.  The existence of ad hoc judges—appointed by national 
parties involved in the dispute for the sole purpose of hearing the case—evidently plays 
into, or at least attempts to placate, latent national interests.  So too does the fact that in 
many cases the entirety of the fifteen judges do not sit; in fact, the ICJ changes the 
composition of its bench for specific cases regularly.74  According to Schwebel, the 
70
 See ICJ website, www.icj-cig.org.
71 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America, 
Nv 1984); see also Herbert W. Biggs, Nicaragua v. United States: Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 79 
AM.J.INT’L L. 373 (April 1985).
72
 Judge Stephen Schwebel.
73
 This was especially so during the Cold War; see Soviet judicial commentary below.
74
 Article 26 allows the Court to “from time to time form one or more chambers, composed of three or more 
judges…for dealing with particular categories of cases.”  STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF 
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reasoning behind the ICJ’s statutory allowance of these “ad hoc chambers” was “to 
permit the parties to the case to influence both the size and the composition of the 
Chamber.”  A State was to be given the ability to fashion not only the identity of the 
adjudicators (via ad hoc judges), but also the number of adjudicators who would get to 
hear the case.75
The Court’s hearing of advisory cases, in addition to contentious matters, also 
allows national politics to be a part of judicial administration.  The existence of 
“advisory” jurisdiction is foreign to many legal systems (especially most common law 
jurisdictions) which hold that only issues “ripe” for adjudication can be heard by a 
court.76  Advisory issues are legal questions about which a political entity in the 
government wishes judicial input; such questions do not require an existing legal conflict.  
That a political organ (the presidency or parliament in the case of many municipal 
systems, and the General Assembly77 in the case of the ICJ) asks for judicial 
JUSTICE, at art. 26.  See also Stephen M. Schwebel, Ad Hoc Chambers of the International Court of Justice. 
81 AM.J.INT’L L.  831 (1987).
75 Id.. at 833.
76 Cf in the United States system:  Gene R. Nichol, Ripeness and the Constitution, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 153 
(1987), LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 5-16, at 356, § 3-10, at 77 (2d ed. 1988) 
(explaining that in the United States system a case may be dismissed for lack of ripeness if future events 
would make the case more suitable for adjudication).  Despite this, there remains some debate in the United 
States regarding the exact powers of the federal and state courts to deliver such “advisory” (rather than 
“judicial”) decisions.  See William A. Fletcher, The “Case or Controversy” Requirement in State Court 
Adjudication of Federal Questions, 78 CALIF. L. REV. 263 (1990).  For details on the Australian system see 
HILARY ASTOR, DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN AUSTRALIA 280 (2002) (describing the ripeness requirement in 
Australian courts for judicial action).  This comparative judicial restraint in the United States and Australia 
is in contrast with the advisory opinions tendered by judges in both Germany and Canada (which has a 
mixed civil and common law system).  See DONALD KOMMERS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF 
THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 15 (1989) and PETER RUSSELL, THE JUDICIARY IN CANADA: THE 
THIRD BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT 91-2 (1987).  See also generally, STEWART JAY, MOST HUMBLE 
SERVANTS: THE ADVISORY ROLE OF EARLY JUDGES (1997).
77
 Though the UN Charter also allows “other organs of the United Nations and specialized agencies” to 
request advisory opinions from the Court, this right has very rarely been exercised.  Of the 25 advisory 
cases referred to the Court, only four were not referred by the General Assembly: Legality of the Use of 
Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict (1993—referred by the World Health Organization), Interpretation of 
the Agreement of 25 March 1951 between the WHO and Egypt (1980—World Health Agency), 
Constitution of the Maritime Safety Committee of the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative 
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determination evidently imbues any decision made with political content.  In the past, 
national interests have been expressed by reference to advisory opinions,78 much to the 
chagrin of many observers who worry that advisory rulings effectively circumvent a 
State’s right to deny the court jurisdiction.   
State action, especially during the Cold War, served to buttress the institutional 
and statutory structure of the ICJ in promoting judicial nationalism.  In the United States, 
in response to fears of acceding control to a “court of foreigners,” the Senate pushed 
through the Connally Amendment, a wide-ranging reservation to ICJ jurisdiction that 
theoretically allowed the United States the final determination as to whether a specific 
issue could go before the body.79  Noting the Communist party membership of most of 
the Warsaw Pact judges, many Western States assumed that party ideology would 
infiltrate the process.  In the Nicaragua vs United States case, the respondent used 
national judicial bias as an explicit rationale for objecting to ICJ jurisdiction over the 
matter:
We will not risk US national security by presenting… material…before a 
Court that includes two judges from Warsaw Pact nations.  This problem 
only confirms the reality that such issues are not suited for the 
International Court of Justice.80
Organization (1959—Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization), Judgments of the 
Administrative Tribunal of the ILO upon Complaints Made against Unesco (1955—UNESCO).  See UN 
CHARTER, at. art. 96(2) and ICJ website.
78
 A common example mentioned is the “court’s 1971 advisory opinion deeming the presence of South 
Africa in Namibia illegal—a ruling that [though “legally” non-binding] contributed to the imposition of 
international sanctions against South Africa.”  Catherine Cook, Israel, the Wall and the Courts: Sending the 
Wrong Message, GLOBAL BEAT SYNDICATE (New York University) (2004) (available at: 
http://www.nyu.edu/globalbeat/syndicate/cook030104.html (last visited Nov 3, 2004)).
79 See Margaret Rague, The Reservation Power and the Connally Amendment, 11 N.Y.U. JNL OF IN’L L. & 
POL. 323 (1978).
80 US Statement on Withdrawal of Case Before the World Court.  NEW YORK TIMES, Jan. 19, 1985, at 4.
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The Soviet view of the ICJ was equally doctrinaire, claiming inter alia, that external, 
political pressure on Western ICJ judges from their respective capitals could be decisive 
to their decision making, that the membership of the ICJ bench did not guarantee the 
USSR with an objective examination of legal issues, and that the entire ICJ bench was in 
the hands of “imperial powers.” 81  The first Soviet judge on the court, Sergei Krylov, did 
little to ease the fears of Western States, often using his opinions to voice political 
rhetoric seemingly dictated from the Kremlin.82
ii. Lack of Empirical Evidence
Despite this history, empirical data concerning the veracity of the underlying 
assumption is both limited and inconclusive.  The halcyon days of the academic literature 
on this issue were during the early Cold War83 when the determinative force of 
nationality—and related spheres of interest—became a preoccupation of many scholars 
and practitioners before the Court.  The thought was not just that the ideological gulf 
between the East and West would be reflected in Court decisions, but also that the judges 
selected by States were chosen because of their allegiance to party line.84
From the historical record, there appeared reason for this belief.  It was noted that 
during the tenure of the PCIJ, there were only ten instances in which a judge voted in 
81 See Zigurds L. Zile, A Soviet Contribution to International Adjudication: Professor Krylov’s 
Jurisprudential Legacy, 58 AM.J.INT’L L. 359 (1964).
82 Id.
83
 However, observers like Lauterpacht raised concerns about judicial nationality much earlier.  See
Lauterpacht, supra note 62, at 215.
84
 One of the reasons the United States provided the court when it withdrew jurisdiction during the 
Nicaragua case was the danger of information leakages from judges hailing from Warsaw Pact countries.  
Statement on the US Withdrawal from the Proceedings Initiated by Nicaragua in the International Court of 
Justice, Jan. 18, 1985, 24 ILM 246, 248 (1985)
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whole or part against the contentions of his government.85  To those certain of the power 
of nationality, this was dispositive; after all, these results seem to show that the initial aim 
of establishing a court “composed of a body of independent judges”86 was fundamentally 
frustrated.  Once the ICJ was established, some commentators explicitly charged that 
judges were not independent, and decisions in which national judges voted against their 
governments were reported with a mix of incredulity and bewilderment.87  In addition to 
this anecdotal evidence, the few empirical studies conducted during this time (Suh 196988
and Hensley 196889) found some correlation between national positions and judicial 
voting.90
However, as quickly as scholars were able to show partiality, others cast doubt on 
the validity of the studies.  For example, while Hersch Lauterpacht claimed that 
correlations between national votes and States party to a particular case, could not be 
“accidental,” others, such as Manley Hudson, argued that mere tabulation of votes was 
not persuasive without a closer examination of the substance of views behind the votes.91
Based on his own service on the PCIJ bench, Hudson “concluded that…judicial 
impartiality…[was] an established fact.”92  Further, scholars promoting the importance of 
national identity were charged with the fallacy of post hoc ergo propter hoc; an 
85
 Further, Samore notes that the PCIJ propagated a “fiction of independence” for some jurists, in the face 
of clear evidence to the contrary.  See Samore, supra note 56, at 200, 193.
86 Advisory Committee of Jurists, Proces-Verbaux of the Proceedings of the Committee iii (1920), art. 2, at 
699.
87
 Samore noted that observers remarked with amazement when the British judge decided to vote against 
his own government, the first time in the history of the post war court.  Samore, supra note 56, at 195.
88 Supra note 3. 
89
 Hensley, supra note 49.
90
 The results were somewhat mixed, with some arguing that national judges on the whole “favorable 
attitudes towards the contentions of their states,” (Suh) and others claiming that national interest was of 
only marginal importance.(Hensley).  See Suh, supra note 3, at 235; Hensley, supra note 49, at 585.
91
 Samore, supra note 56, at 202 (quoting Manley Hudson).
92
 Carl Q. Christol, The United States and the Prospects for a World Rule of Law, 7 S’TH DAK. L. R. 7, 34 
(1962).  
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alignment of votes is not necessarily based on a preceding alignment of national identity 
or interest.93  Indeed, these writers argued both that despite the evidence of national 
concurrence in voting, it was “never thought during PCIJ years that the quality of the 
court’s justice was impeded by the national origins of its judges,”94 and that the impact of 
PCIJ and ICJ judges’ nationalities on decisions was, at best, indeterminate.95
iii. Recent Work on Judicial (In)dependence
Since 1969 there have been no empirical studies examining judicial nationalism 
on the ICJ, and recent literature on the subject notes that while much attention has been 
paid to the independence of national judicial systems, “relatively little” has been written 
on the independence of the international judiciary.96
However, two analytic trends have emerged.  First, using statistical and 
qualitative analyses, there has been a raft of work on the independence of judges in 
domestic systems, and in particular in the United States.97  Judges to the federal bench, 
and in some instances to State courts, are appointed by the executive branch and require 
approval of at least one branch of the legislature.98  Consequently, the process is 
93
 Hardy C. Dillard, A Tribute to Philip C. Jessup and Some Comments on International Adjudication, 62 
COLUM. L. R., 1145 (1962). 
94
 Christol supra note 92, at 35.  Christol also argues that “national differences and varied legal systems do 
not have any material bearing on a given judge’s view of international law.” 
95
 Dillard, supra note 93, 1145.   He wrote that “observations suggest that the characterization of a national 
judge as a “national” judge is neither accurate nor inaccurate.”  This, however, did not imply that there 
were not ever clearly political decisions rendered.  See Samore, supra note 56, at 202.
96 See Mackenzie and Sands, supra note 2 at 276.  The authors describe a “research program” for assessing 
independence, rather than provide any answers on the issue.
97
 Sherrilyn A. Ifill, Judging the Judges: Racial Diversity, Impartiality and Representation on State Trial
Courts, 39 B.C.L.REV 95 (1997).
98 UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, §2, Clause 2.
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manifestly political, and has arguably become more so over the past twenty years.99
Second, in response to the rapid growth of the international judiciary since the end of the 
Cold War,100 questions have arisen, and in some cases qualitative work has been 
published101 and/or jurisprudence has developed, examining the independence of judges 
sitting on trade dispute panels,102 ad hoc international criminal tribunals for the former-
Yugoslavia103 and Rwanda,104 the European Court of Human Rights,105 and the nascent 
ICC.106  Despite these cursory examinations, there remains surprisingly little scholarship 
on international judicial independence.107
99 Cf. Carl Tobias, Federal Judicial Selection in a Time of Divided Government, 47 EMORY L.J. 527 (1998); 
Consult on Judges, Washington Post, A34 (2002); Scott Shepard, Fight Over Bush Nominee Reflects 
Growing Partisanship over Judiciary, COX NEWS SERVICE (2002).
100
 Cesare P.R. Romano, The Proliferation of International Judicial Bodies: The Pieces of the Puzzle, 31
N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 709, 710, 711–23 (1999).
101 Cf Allen N. Sultan, JUDICIAL AUTONOMY UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW, 21 U. DAYTON L. REV. 585 
(1996).
102
 Steve Charnovitz,, Judicial Independence in the World Trade Organization, in INTERNATIONAL 
ORGANIZATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE SETTLEMENT  (Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, Cesare 
Romano, and Ruth Mackenzie, eds. 2002).
103
 For example, the purported lack of independence of the tribunal was a basis for the formal appeal of the 
Furundzija case in the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former-Yugoslavia.  See Prosecutor v.
Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1A, Judgment (July 21, 2000).  Additional jurisprudence was established 
via an interlocutory appeal of Vojislav Seselj in which the accused claimed inter alia that the nationality of 
a judge should disqualify him from presiding.  The court held that the “nationalities…of Judges of this 
Tribunal are, and must be, irrelevant to their ability to hear the cases before them….”  See Prosecutor v 
Sesejl, Case No. IT-03-67-PT, Decision on Motion for Disqualification (June 10, 2003) ¶ 3.
104
 ICTR judges have vigorously defended their judicial autonomy.  In 2000 in response to assertions of 
political meddling, Judge Nieto-Navia argued that he refuted “the suggestion that in reaching decisions, 
political considerations should play a persuasive or governing role, in order to assuage States and ensure 
cooperation to achieve the long-term goals of the Tribunal. On the contrary, in no circumstances would 
such considerations cause the Tribunal to compromise its judicial independence and integrity.”  See ICTR 
Press Release, Barayagwiza to be Tried by ICTR, ICTR/INFO-9-2-226EN.
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 The February 2003 London meeting organized by NGO Interights focused on judicial independence in 
the body.  The resulting document: JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE: LAW AND PRACTICE OF APPOINTMENTS TO 
THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, is available at: http://www.nchr.gr/downloads/Judicial_ 
Appointments_to_ECHR.pdf (last visited July 1, 2004).
106 Supra note 27.
107
 In addition to works by Schwebel, Suh, Samore and Hensley listed elsewhere, some of the few other 
works include, Edith Brown Weiss, Judicial Independence and Impartiality: A Preliminary Inquiry, in THE 
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AT A CROSSROADS 123 (Lori Fisler Damrosch ed., 1987); and Arthur 
Rovine, The National Interest and the World Court, in THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF 
JUSTICE 313 (Leo Gross ed., 1976).
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a. Domestic Studies: The US Federal Bench
Due to the political components of the process, and the evident desire of the 
executive to leave a permanent stamp on the judiciary (appointments to the Federal bench 
are for life), many scholars have long held that the independence of judges was 
compromised both by their ideology and their allegiance to the party/individual that 
placed them in office.  Indeed, a “burgeoning body of research has identified a consistent 
link between the politics of federal judicial appointments and subsequent judicial rulings 
across a variety of dispute categories.”108  In all, “one hundred forty books, articles, 
dissertations, and conference papers are identified in the legal and political-science 
literatures between 1959 and 1998 reporting empirical research pertinent to a link 
between judges' political-party affiliation and judicial ideology in the United States.”109
The result of these studies has been the formalization of various theories of 
judicial behavior, with the key construct being Segal and Cover’s “Attitudinal Model.”110
Now widely held, this model has consistently found that expressions of ideology are 
closely linked with voting patterns on the court.  Simply put:
Court[s] decide disputes in light of the facts of the case vis-
à-vis the ideological attitudes and values of [their] 
justices…[Thus, on the U.S. Supreme Court,] Rehnquist 
votes the way he does because he is extremely 
conservative; Marshall voted the way he did because he is 
extremely liberal.111
108 STEVE ALUMBAUGH AND C. K. ROWLAND PLATFORM BASED APPOINTMENT CRITERIA AND DECISIONS
(1990).
109
 Daniel Pinello, Linking Party to Judicial Ideology in American Courts: A Meta Analysis, 20 THE 
JUSTICE SYSTEM JOURNAL, 219, 219 (1999).
110
 Jeffrey A. Segal and Albert D. Cover. Ideological Values and Votes of U.S. Supreme Court Justices AM. 
POL. SCI. REV.,557  (1989); Jeffrey A. Segal and Harold J. Spaeth. THE SUPREME COURT AND THE 
ATTITUDINAL MODE (1993).
111
 Segal and Spaeth, supra note 110, at 65.  
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Of even greater consequence to the ICJ have been two more recent trends.  First, despite 
the fact that Supreme Court justices are appointed for life, Fleming and Wood found that 
external public opinion impacts the decisions of individual members of the court, thereby 
pressuring decisions that may not have otherwise been made.112  If such a desire for 
public acceptance is present in those who do not have to face an electorate, ICJ judges—
fearful of losing their seat after their terms—may be even more impacted by such 
external stimuli.113  This argument has been made by critics of the European Court of
Human Rights (ECHR), whose judges also face external re-appointment (see below).  
Second, though still silent with respect to the election of ICJ judges, selection of US 
federal judges has become manifestly political, with party members and ideological 
factions demanding leadership appoint like-minded judges to the bench.114
b. International Legal Independence
As the size of the international judiciary has grown, scholarship seeking to 
evaluate the “credibility, legitimacy and efficacy” of the judicial corps has begun to 
expand.  However, though a research agenda has been laid out by various scholars,115 as 
of yet, studies conducted have been either introductory or qualitative116 in nature.  
112
 Roy B. Fleming and B. Dan Wood. The Public and the Supreme Court: Individual Justice 
Responsiveness to American Public Moods, 41 AM. J. POL. SCI., 468 (1997).
113
 ICJ judges are de facto shielded from internal ouster.  Article 18 of the ICJ Statute allows removal of a 
judge only if “in the unanimous opinion of the other members, he has ceased to fulfill the required 
conditions.”  (Emphasis added)  THE STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, at art. 18.
114
 This has been true of many recent appointees who rank-and-file party members have claimed have not 
been liberal/conservative enough.  For example, some Republicans view Justice Souter, a U.S. Supreme 
Court justice appointed by the first President Bush—a Republican—in 1991, on the bench as 
disappointingly liberal, and wish the president had nominated a more tried-and-true judicial conservative.  
The same was said about Justice Brennan, the very liberal justice who was appointed by the Republic 
Dwight Eisenhower.  See: David Alistar Yalof, PURSUIT OF JUSTICES: PRESIDENTIAL POLITICS AND THE 
SELECTION OF SUPREME COURT NOMINEES (1999).
115
 Mackenzie and Sands argue that questions of judicial legitimacy play out over motley dimensions: 
“…including the procedures for the nomination, selection, and re-election of international judges; the 
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Given the sophistication and history of their multi-national judicial system, it is 
not surprising that member States of the Council of Europe have led the way in such 
analysis.  In particular, the nomination procedures of judges to the ECHR have been 
under particularly intense scrutiny.  A 2003 report discussed six major problems with the 
process, most of which could be attributed to the ICJ selection system as well. 
1. States have absolute discretion with respect to the nomination system 
they adopt. Governments are not given guidelines on procedures, nor 
are they required to report on or account for their national nomination 
processes….Nominees often lack…necessary experience….
2. The Committee of Ministers, while on paper the body that should be 
empowered to engage with governments on their nomination 
procedures and reject unacceptable lists, is concerned more with 
safeguarding State sovereignty than with ensuring the quality of 
nominated candidates....
4. At the final stage, the Parliamentary Assembly is provided with 
limited information on candidates and…political groups appear to
dictate voting patterns. Lobbying by States, and occasionally by 
judicial candidates, jeopardizes the future independence (actual and 
apparent) of judges. 
5. The current possibility of re-appointing sitting judges renders them 
particularly susceptible to unacceptable interference from their 
governments and risks obedience to their governments. 
6. The result is a Court less qualified and less able to discharge its crucial 
mandate than it might otherwise be. The Court also suffers from 
gender imbalance, at least in part due to the opaque and politicized 
nature of the nomination and election procedure.117
Though the ECHR work is the only targeted analysis of a particular court that has been 
conducted, there are three other emerging branches of scholarship broadly addressing 
relationship between the international judge and the parties or issues before the court the outside activities 
of international judges; and finally, the relationship between judicial and political organs.”  See Mackenzie 
and Sands, supra note 2, at 276.
116
 The only truly quantitative study conducted the independence of ICJ judges was by Hensley in 1968 
who claimed to be able to use mathematical coding of cases and the national interests represented in them, 
in order to finely parse the national-bias impact of judicial voting.  He even argued that his coding could 
differentiate between “the influence of culturally inculcated values and the effect of national interests.”  See 
Hensley, supra note 49, at 570.
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issues of judicial independence in the international realm.  First, an especially contentious 
debate has begun concerning the “effectiveness” of international adjudication.  The 
independence of the international bench is a key component of this debate, with Eric 
Posner and John Yoo arguing that effective international courts are more likely to consist 
of dependent jurists,118 while Laurence Helfer and Anne-Marie Slaughter have argued 
otherwise.119
The present paper does not buttress either finding, but it does question their 
shared initial assumption that being “dependent” (based on national identity) is actually a 
status that significantly impacts judicial decisionmaking.  Both sides of the debate 
analyze independence of a court on a ex ante basis—based on its structure, mandate and 
process of nomination.120  While ex poste compliance is also examined, the step prior to 
enforcement—an investigation of the actual votes cast by members of the bench—is 
absent from both.  By examining the voting record, the current article will hopefully 
provide added nuance to the ongoing discussion.
Two further branches of scholarship are worthy of brief note for their reference to 
nationality and independence.  First, there is nascent work on the governance of 
international legal institutions due to the recognition that their opaqueness—primarily in 
their decision making processes—precludes a clear understanding of the problems and 
potential solutions in governance.  The regulation of judges is a central element in this 
117 See supra note 105; as a result some eminent jurists have called for the reform of the nomination system.  
See David Pannick, There Needs to be Reform at the European Court of Human Rights, TIMES (OF 
LONDON), Oct 21, 2003.
118 See Laurence R. Helfer and Ann-Marie Slaughter, Of States, Bargains and Judges: The Limited Role of 
Dependence in International Adjudication, 93 CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming May 2005), which responds to 
Eric A. Posner and John C. Yoo, A Theory of Adjudication, THE CHICAGO WORKING PAPER SERIES INDEX
(http://www.law.uchicago.edu/Lawecon/index.html), February 2004. (last visited Nov 1, 2004).
119
 Laurence R. Helfer and Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational 
Adjudication, 107 YALE L. J. 273 (1997); 
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inquiry.121  Second, scholarship is expanding regarding the Court’s ability to provide 
decisions in highly-political cases.122  This work brings to light the “obvious problems of 
the international legal system: its basis of consensual jurisdiction and the reluctance, and 
at times the recalcitrance, of States to comply with the Court’s decisions.”123  An ICJ 
jurist’s recent questioning of the independence of a fellow jurist in the highly-political 
Israel Wall case represents another facet of this issue, in which doubts as to the ability for 
the ICJ bench to adjudicate impartially are beginning to be expressed from within the 
organization.124
PART III: ANALYSIS
The initial difficulty with researching how nationality matters on the ICJ rests on 
the equivocal meaning of the word “matter.”  There are at least three primary ways in 
which the word can be assessed—this tripartite analysis forms the basis of the 
investigation that follows.  First, nationality could “matter” if it were shown that judges 
consistently vote for their own States when they are party to a case.  It was this aspect of 
“matter” that prior research seems to have implied.  Such an analysis, replicated in part 
below, suggests that by the end of the twentieth century, the findings of the 1960s—that,
120 Id.
121
 Vagts argues that various aspects of professional behavior are not well regulated, and in particular is the 
“anomalous role assigned to national judges and party-appointed arbitrators.” See Vagts, supra note 3, at 
261.
122 Andrew Coleman, The ICJ and Highly Political Matters, MEL. J. OF INT’L L. (2003), 29-75.  See also
Marcella David, Passport to Justice: Internationalizing the Political Question Doctrine for Application in 
the World Court, 40 HARV. INT’L L.J. 81 (1999).
123 See Coleman, supra note 122, at 29.
124
 Dissenting opinion of Justice Thomas Buergenthal  in Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall 
in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Regarding Composition of the Court, (Int’l Ct. Justice Jan. 30, 
2004).
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by-and-large, national judges tend to support the interests of their own States—finds 
support, though its presumed “absolute” nature is quickly diminishing.  
A second manner in which nationality could be said to “matter” goes beyond the 
parties to any particular case and recognizes that a judge’s nationality is theoretically a 
constant, existing in cases other than those in which he decides on his own nation’s fate.  
Indeed, those cases in which a judge is ruling regarding his own State, or even his own 
State’s interests, represent a very small proportion of votes.125  If judges’ citizenships are 
important, should we not also expect judges to not only vote for their States, but also at 
times to vote as their States?  That is, if nationality matters, the amities and animosities 
present between nations in the wider political realm should be replicated, to a non-trivial 
degree, within ICJ decision making.  This was the contention held by Warsaw Pact 
judges on the ICJ throughout the Cold War, during which they argued that limiting 
parties to be represented by a single judge on the bench was ineffective because “a whole 
line of Western States completely subordinate their foreign policies to the directives of 
the Anglo-American bloc.”126  Further, if countries were only concerned about the direct 
impact a judge had on their fortunes, the rarity of countries appearing before the court, 
would likely strip ICJ elections of much of their political import.  Evidence of voting “as 
a country” is difficult to show definitively, especially in cases in which national interests 
are hard to identify.127  Consequently, this paper uses “alliance” voting as a proxy.  
Evidence of the importance of judicial nationality would derive from a record of judges 
125
 Hensley attempted to account for this by coding decisions by national interest.  This seems a dubious 
process, especially for assessing smaller state interests.  See Hensley, supra note 49.  
126
 Zile, supra note 81, at 382.
127
 On today’s court there are several representatives of “minor” States—such as Sierra Leone and 
Madagascar—the interests of which are only indirectly impacted by most of the decisions rendered by the 
Court.  For example, in the recent case Certain Property (Liechtenstein v. Germany) it would be hard to 
assess which side best represents/protects Sierra Leone’s interests.
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casting votes alongside judges from States sharing their own nation’s interests, and 
against those judges whose States have interests antithetical to their own State’s.
A third, more institutionally-important interpretation of “matter” would analyze 
whether national identity not only leads judges to vote with their States, but that such 
votes impact the outcome of court decisions.  If a decision is rendered with a vote of 
fourteen judges ruling for the plaintiff and one ruling for the defendant, that the sole 
dissenter is a co-national of the defendant may be interesting from an academic 
perspective, but does not actually impact the work of the court, the formation of 
international law,128 or the provision of justice.  
A. DATA
To examine the judicial independence of the ICJ bench, a dataset was established 
covering nearly all of the 83129 contentious130 cases heard by the body since its founding 
in 1949 until 2000.  The data is bound by the Corfu Channel case in 1949 and the Case 
Concerning the Belgian Arrest Warrant in 2000.  The data does not distinguish between 
votes made on the merits of a case and those on procedural or “preliminary measures.”  
In so doing this study follows the precedent of the work done in the 1960s, allows for a 
far-greater number of votes to be analyzed, and recognizes that especially in the ICJ 
128
 There are exceptions to this; for instance, regarding “universal jurisdiction” the most referenced 
definition of the concept does not come from the majority opinion rendered, but from a dissenting opinion.  
See Joint Separate Opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal, in Arrest Warrant of 11 April 
2000 (ICJ).
129
 Six of these cases are not included due to incomplete data or conflicting data from various sources.  Data 
comes from ICJ voting records in Bimal N. Patel (ed), THE WORLD COURT REFERENCE GUIDE (2002).  
Works also consulted include Nagendra Singh, THE ROLE AND RECORD OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF 
JUSTICE (1989), Shabtai Rosenne, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, 
1920-1996 (1997). 
130
 Only contentious cases are being examined for two reasons.  In order to make the analysis comparable 
with those undertaken in other jurisdictions, a demand that the adjudication be made on “ripe” issues was 
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context votes that occur before the merits (and in particular votes to assert or deny ICJ 
jurisdiction) are often more determinative and more “politically” and “judicially” 
important than is the final vote on a matter.  In all the dataset includes 163 instances of 
voting.  
Each instance of voting is examined independently and disaggregated by the vote 
of each judge.  Thus, in the 163 instances of voting, the data comprises 992 independent 
votes by judges from 79 countries.  Table I lists those countries, organized by how many 
votes “their” judges cast between 1949 and 2000.
Table I
Vote Participation by Country
5 or Fewer Votes 6 to 20 21 to 35 36 to 50 51 or more
Albania
Bahrain
Benin
Bulgaria
Burkina Faso
Burundi
Chad
Colombia
Croatia
Denmark
DR Congo
Ethiopia
Guatemala
Guinea-Bissau
Indonesia
Iran
Israel
Jordan
Lebanon
Libya
Liechtenstein
Malaysia
Mali
Malta
New Zealand
Panama
Peru
Philippines
Portugal
Qatar
Rwanda
South Africa
Sweden
Switzerland
Tunisia
Uganda
Australia
Belgium
Bosnia
 & Herzegovina
Cameroon
Canada
Chile
El Salvador
Greece
Honduras
Mexico
Pakistan
Slovakia
Spain
Uruguay
Egypt
Nicaragua
Syria
W. Germany
Yugoslavia
Guyana
India
Netherlands
Norway
Senegal
Algeria
Argentina
Brazil
China
France
Germany
Hungary
Italy
Japan
Madagascar
Nigeria
Poland
Russia
Sierra Leone
Sri Lanka
UK
US
USSR
Venezuela
critical.  Second, though advisory opinions are inherently political, the ICJ’s legal/judicial muscle is only 
supposed to be felt in its binding, contentious decisions.  
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This table elucidates the first limitation of the claim about the importance of 
nationality.  Though 79 States have been represented on the Court, only 40 percent of
those States have voted in significant numbers (21 or more times).  Consequently, though 
instances of voting by those States with only minimal experience on the bench may or 
may not indicate a national bias, the selectivity of the sample means that extrapolation 
would be highly uncertain.  Moreover, there may be a selection bias within those States; 
the majority of States who have voted infrequently received their few votes from the ad 
hoc judges they appointed for cases to which they were party.  As ad hoc judges often 
vote for the States that appoint them (see below), analyzing the nationalism of judges 
representing these States may distort reality.    
B.  INTERPRETATION I: NATIONALITY AS A PREDICTOR OF JUDICIAL VOTE
Before disaggregating the data, it is enlightening to examine the macro-results.  
As Table II indicates, on its face the concern about a lack of judicial autonomy appears 
somewhat warranted.  Eighty percent of the time in which they were able to do so, 
national judges voted with their countries when they were party to a case.  Though this 
number falls slightly when examining term judges—indicating a modicum of 
independence, especially when compared with ad hoc judges—the amount of agreement 
is still substantial at 70 percent.    
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Table II
Voting in Line with National Interests when a Judge’s State is Party to a Case
Total Agreement Disaggregated
Solely Term Judges Solely Ad Hoc Judges
Votes in Line Votes Cast Votes in Line Votes Cast Votes in Line Votes Cast
223
80%
278 91
70%
130 132
89%
148
However, this aggregate data is somewhat opaque.  In the line with post hoc ergo 
propter hoc fallacy mentioned above, it is not immediately apparent what a vote in 
accord with a judge’s national interests actually means.  It is too easy to establish a 
causation argument from seeing such a vote, when it is equally possible that a judge of a 
specific nationality voted in a certain manner not because of his citizenship but because 
of his detached judicial reasoning.      
Consequently, it is highly likely that the soaring percentages seen in the 
aggregated figures overstate the amount of national bias at work.  Disaggregating the 
votes, as Suh undertook in his seminal 1969 study, 131 should provide greater clarity on 
the possible impact of national preference on judicial decision making.  Suh analyzed 
four particular voting patterns, which aim to extract the degree to which national judges 
have been inclined to vote for or against the contentions of their governments.  The Table 
below replicates Suh’s findings, and juxtaposes the 1969 figures with those from the 
present study.  To normalize for different numbers of votes, the table replicates Suh’s 
methodology but provides the percentage of total votes represented by each category
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Table III
Suh 1969 vs. Smith 2004 (in percent)
Suh Smith Suh Smith Suh Smith
Ad Hoc Term Total
Voting Against His Govt’s Position
Against the Majority of the Court
As Only Dissenter 0.0 2.8 0.0 0.4 0.0 3.3
With Other Dissenters 0.0 6.5 2.0 0.0 2.0 6.5
Total 0.0 9.3 2.0 0.4 2.0 9.8
With the Majority of the Court
Unanimous 3.0 1.6 5.9 3.7 8.9 5.3
Simple Majority 2.5 6.5 4.4 2.0 6.9 8.5
Total 5.4 8.1 10.3 5.7 15.8 13.8
Voting For His Govt’s Position
With the Majority of the Court
Unanimous 3.4 2.4 2.5 3.7 5.9 6.1
Simple Majority 24.1 23.8 17.7 16.7 41.9 40.2
Total 27.6 26.0 20.2 20.3 47.8 46.3
Against the Majority of the Court
As Only Dissenter 4.9 3.3 0.5 5.3 5.4 8.5
With Other Dissenters 20.7 10.2 8.4 11.4 29.1 21.5
Total 25.6 13.4 8.9 16.7 34.5 30.1
Grand Total 58.6 56.9 41.4 43.1 100.0 100.0
Suh’s work analyzed four voting patterns, with two that the author claimed 
manifested judicial independence, and two claimed to demonstrate judicial adherence to 
national contentions.  The latter two patterns, described as votes in line with a judge’s 
national interests and either falling alongside the majority of the Court or as dissents 
show only a modicum of change from Suh’s study to the present inquiry.132  In fact there 
are only two significant alterations, both indicating growing comfort of judges (both ad 
hoc and term) to cast a vote as the sole dissent.  The proportion of ad hoc votes that were 
cast with other dissenters fell from 20.7 percent in 1969 to 10.2 percent in 2004.  Further, 
131 Supra note 3.
132 Id.
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the proclivity for term judges to be the sole dissent in favor of their national position 
more than quintupled from 0.5 percent to 5.3 percent.    
While these two voting patterns are in line with government interests, Suh used 
the robustness of voting in his initial voting patterns—against government interests—to 
demonstrate as fundamentally flawed the “contention that national judges, even ad hoc
judges, will always support the case of their governments.”133  These figures remain 
robust; while Suh found almost 18 percent of the judge’s votes were against their State 
interests, by 2000 it was found that approximately 24 percent of judicial votes were cast 
against State interests.  Though it remains rare for a national judge to be the sole dissent 
in such cases, the trend does appear to reflect a growing independence of judicial voting, 
on behalf of both ad hoc and term judges.      
Table IV
National Judges Voting with…
…the Majority (votes cast) …the Minority (votes cast)  If in Minority, was it sole 
Dissent? (votes cast)
157
55%
131
45%
29
22%
C. INTERPRETATION II: NATIONALITY AS A PREDICTOR OF ALLIANCE VOTING
If nationality is a factor in judicial decision making, it would be logical that it 
would impact voting patterns in cases, in addition to those in which a judge rules on the 
fate of his own State.  As mentioned above, the proxy used is “alliance” voting, which 
analyzes voting agreement (or discord) among judges from specific States.    
133 Id. at 228. (Emphasis added).
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There are two hypotheses with which this paper examines alliance voting.  First, 
due to the ideological chasm between East and West during the Cold War, the degree of 
agreement between Cold War adversaries should likely be less than the degree of 
agreement between the same players after the Cold War.  However, as Table V indicates, 
this hypothesis is belied by the history of vote agreement between judges from the major 
Western powers and Soviet judges, and then the same Western States and their Russian 
counterparts after 1989.
Table V
Percentage of Vote Agreement Between Judges from Various States
Agreement with… Agreement with…
USSR Russia
US
UK
France
Germany*
Italy
50%
66
84
81
85
57
60
69
54
83
* “Germany” refers to the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) prior to 1990, and to unified 
Germany after that year.
Indeed, it is only the United States that manifests any increase in voting 
agreement following the transfer of power from the USSR to Russia.  Perhaps even more 
surprising is the degree to which States arrayed against one another during the Cold War 
nonetheless agreed on votes.  West German, French and Italian judges agreed with their 
Soviet counterparts more than 80 percent of the time.  The disagreement that pervaded 
the Security Council during the Cold War—during which time a veto from an opposing 
power was almost guaranteed—clearly did not carry over into the majority of ICJ 
decisions.
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The second hypothesis looks at voting agreement among putative allies.  Here too, 
if nationality is an important predictor of voting behavior, allies should tend to agree with 
one another.  Again, as manifest in Table VI, this does not appear to have always been 
the case.
Table VI
Percentage of Vote Agreement Between Judges from Various States
Western Bloc
US UK France Italy Netherlands
US
UK
France
Italy
Netherlands
-
82%
73%
63%
77%
82%
-
85%
87%
97%
72%
85%
-
92%
89%
63%
87%
92%
-
100%
77%
97%
89%
100%
-
Eastern Bloc
USSR Russia Poland Hungary China
USSR
Russia
Poland
Hungary
China
-
-
96%
55%
84%
-
-
-
55%
92%
96%
-
-
40%
87%
55%
55%
40%
-
64%
84%
92%
87%
64%
-
While there is a general high level of agreement, for most country pairs vote 
accordance is far from absolute, and in some cases reveals a surprising degree of judicial 
autonomy.  For instance, while high Polish-Soviet accord should be expected, the discord 
between USSR and Hungarian voting is contrary to the control Moscow exerted over 
Budapest from 1956.  Similarly on the Western Bloc side, while the United States and 
French agreement of 72 percent seems in accord with their fluctuating diplomatic 
relationship, it is hard to explain from a national-interest perspective the comparatively 
low level of agreement between Italy and the United States, or between The Netherlands 
and the United States.  
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While national-interest may not explain the low level of agreement between 
judges from some Western European states and those from the United States, it is 
possible that the high level of agreement between the “middle-level” powers in the 
Western grouping (Netherlands, Italy and France—all of whom agreed with each other 
more than 80 percent of the time) can be explained in the terms of regional power.  The 
international relations literature speaks of alliances among such middle powers as a key 
strategy for non-superpowers to further their interests by establishing a multi-national 
power bloc with which the superpowers must contend.134  The high-level of agreement 
among Continental European states—who have historically been far more committed to 
each other and the “European” enterprise than has the U.K.—would provide “judicial” 
support to this claim and may be a manner in which national interest writ-large does play 
a role in ICJ deliberations.  
D. INTERPRETATION III: NATIONALITY AS A DETERMINANT FACTOR IN CASES 
The analysis suggests that the findings of the 1960s about judicial nationalism 
were never unconditional.  Moreover, any existing nationalism seems to have moderated 
as judges, sitting both as ad hoc and term jurists, have begun to assert greater 
independence.  Moreover, even if judges were to become more nationalistic the data 
indicate that the ability for national judges to direct court outcomes is more than 
mitigated by the presence of other judges on the bench.  Of the 163 voting instances 
under examination, only four consisted of votes in which the difference between votes for 
134
 The search for a strong Europe as a counterweight against the United States has been a clear element in 
the foreign policies of many European states since World War II, and most intensively since the end of the 
Cold War.  See generally, John van Oudeneran, Unipolar Versus Unilateral, POL. REV. 63 (April 2004), 
Don Melvin, Europeans Debate Relations with the U.S., ATL. JN’L CONSTIT, Aug. 10, 2003, at 2B.
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the plaintiffs and defense was one.  For the vast majority of ICJ decisions, the existence 
of a blatantly nationalist vote would not sway the actual outcome of a decision, even if it 
would impact the vote totals.135  Moreover, given the very few votes in which the 
majority and dissent were nearly equally split, even the impact of the regional judicial 
blocs (discussed above in reference to the seeming Western European voting bloc) would 
have little bearing on final outcomes. 
PART III:  THE WEAKENING OF JUDICIAL “NATIONALISM”
The UN Charter and the ICJ Statute were written to reflect a Westphalian world in 
which States were the only legitimate transnational actors, and nationality, in turn, was a 
prime aspect of individual definition.  As this reality has broken down—and non-State 
actors and individuals have increasingly operated in the international sphere outside the 
realm of State control—any focus on “nationality” as a determinant of behavior becomes 
problematic.  The changing nature of “nationality,” international action, and especially 
international disputes, has made citizenship an imprecise instrument of analysis and 
potentially an anachronistic tool with which to analyze “independence.”  The result, as 
the data above indicate, is that “nationality” is a relatively poor predictor of voting on the 
ICJ, other than in the rare incidences in which a judge is ruling on his own country’s fate.
135
 Suh argues that the impact of ad hoc judges on end results is even more diffused.  Writing in 1969 he 
claimed that there were only two cases (in both ICJ and PCIJ history) “that the vote of an ad hoc judge was 
definitive in deciding a case…,(S.S. Lotus and Southwest Africa).”  Suh, supra note 3, at 232.
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A. JUDGE-BASED CHALLENGES TO NATIONAL BIAS
The inaccuracy of “nationality” as a driver of voting stems from an adherence to 
archaic views about the stability of individual citizenship, and the role of the State as the 
prime source for individual values.  
Indeed, a belief in the determinative force of judicial nationality assumes that 
nationality has a constancy, let alone immutability, increasingly belied by facts.  Current 
United States judges on both the ICTY and ICJ were foreign born, and in the case of the 
ICTY the United States judge actually had a substantial professional life in the Israeli 
foreign ministry (rising to the rank of ambassador and UN representative) before 
emigrating to the United States.136  The United States ICJ incumbent was born in 
Slovakia and migrated to the United States.  Other judges on the ICJ represent similar 
multiple national histories; of the 15, only four were both born and educated entirely in 
the country they represent.137  If nationality is determinant, it is unclear which of a 
judge’s nationalities—the place of her birth? her education? her current residence?—
moves her to decide to in a specific manner.     
In addition to ascribing a degree of permanence to nationality, for judicial 
nationalism to matter, States would have to assume a predictability and stability to 
judicial belief and decision making contradicted by history and domestic evidence. As 
justices in the United States such as Brennan and Souter have shown,138 the outward 
appearance of a judge’s specific ideology while he is a candidate for appointment may 
136
 Thomas Adcock, International Law Professor Takes On War Crimes Abroad: NYU’s Meron Assumes 
Duties as Chief Judge of War Crimes Tribunal, N.Y. LAW J. (2003); Michael D. Goldhaber, War and 
Justice--Two American Holocaust Survivors Arrive in The Hague This Year, Where They’ll Make History 
by Judging It, AM. LAWYER (2001).
137 See ICJ website.
138 Supra note 114.
42
not translate into consistent voting in line with his professed ideology once he is chosen.  
As in domestic systems, once a judge is on the international bench, it is often hard to 
accurately predict a judge’s decisions.  At times, international judges have chosen to rely 
on precedent, trumping personal views; at other times personal prejudice (and perhaps 
even national bias) is expressed, contrary to established court findings.  The uncertainty 
of both the limits of customary international law,139 and the role of precedent in the 
international system—due to the system’s dual “civil” and “common” law roots—makes 
it even more difficult to make predictions about judicial decision making.140
Related to the inherent fluidity of “nationality,” an additional source of the 
weakness of “judicial nationalism” comes from the fact that the idea has as a base 
premise an increasingly questionable understanding of “nationalism.”  In this context 
“nationalism” relies on two inter-linked theories of citizenship: first, there is a long-held 
notion that co-nationals bring needed “local” insight into the judicial decision making 
process;141 and, second, there is an even stronger view that co-nationals will tend to side 
139
 Susan W. Tiefenbrun, The Role of the World Court in Settling International Disputes: A Recent 
Assessment, 20 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 1, 20 (1997).  Tiefenbrun argues that these factors lead to a 
fundamental unpredictability in the Court’s decisions.  Id. 
140
 For example, the Appeals Judgment in the ICTY case The Prosecutor vs. Zlatko Aleksovski cogently 
states the confused status of precedent in international humanitarian law:
The Chamber recognizes that in both the common law and civil law systems, the 
highest courts, whether as a matter of doctrine or of practice, will normally follow their 
previous decisions and will only depart from them in exceptional circumstances. This is 
to preserve the principles of consistency, certainty and predictability. The need to 
preserve these principles is particularly great in criminal law where the liberty of the 
individual is implicated. The same principles apply in International Tribunals.
The fundamental purpose of this Tribunal is the prosecution of persons 
responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law. The Appeals 
Chamber considers that this purpose is best served by an approach which, while 
recognizing the need for certainty, stability and predictability, also recognizes that there 
may be instances in which the strict, absolute application of that principle may lead to 
injustice.
The Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, Appeals Chamber Judgment, 24 March 2000.
141
 This was the basis behind the Root-Phillimore Plan that influenced the drafting of the statute of the 
Permanent Court of International Justice, which was subsequently transposed onto the International Court 
of Justice.  Schwebel, supra note 42, at 889.  See also, Proces-verbaux supra note 35, at 721, 722.
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with one another out of an allegiance fomented through shared citizenship.  Regarding 
the provision of “local” knowledge, the growth of an international legal ethic, and the 
creation of a larger, increasingly homogenous epistemic community of international 
jurists, suggests that any “local” conception is quickly becoming internationalized.142
The posited “Strasbourg Effect,”143 by which trans-Atlantic jurists are coming to reason 
in the same manner, and the wider collegial and intellectual intermingling among the 
world’s jurists (via “Transjudicial Communication”144) are potent examples of this 
trend.145
Concerning the allegiance of shared citizenship, there is a branch of political 
philosophy that both identifies and supports such “liberal nationalism.”146  However, 
globalization, and the increasing porousness of borders (manifest by the SARS epidemic, 
financial flows and other phenomena) suggest that such “particularlistic” modes of 
identity are fast being replaced by more universalistic modes.
142
 Moreover, H. Lauterpacht claims that it is not the role of the judge to “inform” the court of any of the 
specific, culturally/nationally relevant components of the case; rather, that task is left to the pleadings.  
Lauterpacht, supra note 62, at 215.
143
 Michael C. Dorf, FINDLAW FORUM: The International Influence on the Supreme Court Decision on 
Executions (June 19, 2002), at http://writ.news.findlaw.com/dorf/20020626.html (last visited Nov 1, 2004).
144
 Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Typology of Transjudicial Communication, 29 U. RICH. L. REV. 99 (1994). 
145
 Whereas observers in the early 1960s were keen to analyze the legal backgrounds of sitting judges 
(common, law, Roman law, Asian law, etc.), it is clear that today’s international jurists have had a wide 
exposure to many different types of law, and the increasingly individualized “international” branch.  See 
Christol, supra note 92, at 32.  This trend renders quaint early observations of the influence felt by 
international officials due to their “culturally inculcated values”:  “He carries with him the whole collection 
of habitual ways of acting, of fixed ideas and value judgments of his own community, which he is prone to 
expand into ideas of universal validity.”  Dunn, supra note 49, at 105. (Quoted in Hensley, supra note 49, 
at 581).
146
 For details on such Liberal Nationalism see David Miller, ON NATIONALISM (1995), Yael Tamir, 
LIBERAL NATIONALISM (1993), Samuel Scheffler, BOUNDARIES AND ALLEGIANCES (2001).  
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B.  INSTITUTION-BASED CHALLENGES TO NATIONAL BIAS
Apart from the de-nationalizing tendencies of judges themselves, the ICJ itself has 
proven too institutionally complex to allow nationality-based voting real power in the 
Chambers.  Most prosaically, the ICJ has adopted many of the same safeguards present in 
municipal systems to protect the autonomy of judges,147 barring them from engaging in 
certain activities while on the bench, demanding recusal148 if a judge has taken part in the 
issue in another capacity, and ensuring that judges’ travel reimbursements and tax-free 
salaries are not reduced during their tenures.149
Further, recent decisions have manifest that the ICJ does not operate in a judicial 
vacuum, and especially in the rendering of advisory opinions, it is integrated into the 
public and the political; consequently, expectations of those outside the Chamber clearly 
weigh on decision making.  Judicial deference to one another, a norm with few 
exceptions in international fora, combined with the goal of most Court presidents to build 
strong majorities on decisions, appears to regularly trump national interests.150  Further, 
the most important institutional pressure is the same one that exists in all courts: how far 
should the ICJ should go in determining the law?  That is, are ICJ adjudicators judges of 
existing law, or the creators/developers of international law?  It is this separation—
147 Cf Brazil’s constitution which bars judges from engaging in certain activities while on the bench.  (Lei 
Organic ada Magistratura Nacional Interpretada (Rio de Janeiro, Livraria Freitas Bastos S.A., 1983.) §II 
and III; Samore, supra note 36, at 623. Samore points to various features of the court safeguarding 
impartiality after appointment regarding compensation, rules on incompatibility, disqualification etc.     
148 THE STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, at arts. 16, 17, 23; NB, these are very similar 
safeguards adopted by other international judicial bodies.  Eg. See, e.g., UNCLOS, supra note 5, art. 7(1) 
(“No member of the Tribunal may exercise any political or administrative function, or associate actively 
with or be financially interested in any of the operations of any enterprise concerned with the exploration 
for or exploitation of the resources of the sea or the seabed or other commercial use of the sea or the 
seabed.”).
149 STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, at art. 32.
150
 This contention is inferred from the large proportion of decisions that have few, if any, dissents.  See 
above.  
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between the reactive and proactive judges—that seems to most impact ICJ decisions, and 
in particular the initial decision whether or not to accept a case.151
Additionally, in certain instances, the Court itself has held that it either does not 
have the requisite law to decide a matter, or does not have the jurisdiction to hear specific 
matters it deems “inherently political.”  The ICJ saw different parts of its bench make 
each claim in Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons.152  The 
internationalization of the “political question” doctrine153 present in many municipal 
systems154 has seen the ICJ refuse to hear “highly political disputes – that is, those 
disputes where the national interests…are threatened.”155  When refusing jurisdiction 
under the political question doctrine, the Court technically denies the hearing of a case 
because it implicates a legislative rather than judicial function; however, there are also 
pragmatics at stake, including the likely inability for the Court to “make a significant 
151
 For Hersch Lauterpacht this issue “arose out of the question: How far should the Court go, in deciding a 
concrete issue before it, not only in acting on legal principles but in stating those principles, in specifying 
the broader legal principle underlying the rule actually applied.”  Rosenne, supra note 43, at 834.  
152
 Regarding an absence of law on the matter, Justice Higgins wrote in her dissent that “the Court 
effectively pronounces a non liquet on the key issue on the grounds of uncertainty in the present state of 
law….”  Dissenting Opinion, ICJ Rep. 1996, 226, 583, ¶ 2.  Judge Shi’s Declaration and Judge Oda’s 
Dissent, made the claim that the issue was more appropriately addressed by legislative/executive, rather 
than judicial, means. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion of 8 July 1996.       
http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/icases/iunan/iunanframe.htm. (last visited Nov 3, 2004).
153 See David, supra note 122.
154
 Though there is academic debate on the existence of the “political question” doctrine, components of it 
are evident in many systems.  Cf: J. Peter Mulhern, In Defense of the Political Question Doctrine 137 U. 
PA. L. REV. 97 (1988) and Goldwater v Carter supra note 95 (In his concurrence in Goldwater v. Carter, 
444 U.S. 996, 998 (1979), Justice Powell summarized the criteria for “political question” into three 
inquiries: “(i)Does the issue involve resolution of questions committed by the text of the Constitution to 
coordinate branch of government? (ii) Would resolution of the question demand that a court move beyond 
areas of judicial expertise? (iii) Do prudential considerations counsel against judicial intervention?” Any 
one of these characteristics may be sufficient to preclude judicial review.”); James A. Thomson, Non-
justiciability and the Australian Constitution, in POWER, PARLIAMENT AND THE PEOPLE (Michael Coper 
and George Williams (eds.) 1997), 56; debates on the justiciability vs. non-justiciability of issues was also 
heavily present in the Quebec Secession case (Reference re Secession of Quebec from Canada (1998) 161 
DLR (4th) 385.
155
 Coleman, supra note 122, at 31.
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contribution to the peaceful resolution of highly political disputes.”156  Moreover, the 
Court’s decision in many cases could be interpreted as denying jurisdiction because a 
case could give rise to nationalist passions on its bench.    
Finally, though the judges’ votes are simplified into binary agreement or 
disagreement with the majority, in truth the positions of judges are almost always more 
nuanced.  The existence of dissenting and concurring opinions and declarations, provides 
scope for judges to express more finely crafted views that may neither fully support nor 
condemn the findings of the majority. 157  Such ancillary opinions allow a judge to “split” 
his vote, casting a ballot for his “national interest,” while maintaining certain reservations 
in the decision, or vice-versa.158  The lack of anonymity with which dissents are filed has 
also been thought to “guarantee against any subconscious intrusion of political 
considerations.”159  Such anonymity “may spur a judge to vote invariably in support of 
the cause of his State without incurring the odium of partisanship.”160  Moreover, it has 
been suggested that published, dissenting opinions act “as a safeguard of the individual 
156 Id. This trend has developed through a “more realistic appreciation” of the Court’s role and an 
understanding that “[rather] than thinking of the Court as a forum for the settlement of all international 
disputes, it is more realistic to accept that some disputes require political decisions by a political body.”  
Tiefenbrun, supra note 139, at 23.  Despite this, based on the Court’s recent acceptance of advisory 
jurisdiction on Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, in 
the face of widespread national boycott of the proceedings—for fear of politicizing the court—suggests that 
this may be changing.
157
 The separate opinions issued by judges in the recent Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall 
in the Occupied Palestinian Territory illustrate the complexities lying behind agreement or disagreement 
with the court’s vote.  For instance, though, for example, Justices Higgins, Elaraby and Al-Khasawneh all 
voted in accord, their separate opinions demonstrate significant differences both in underlying reasoning 
and the strength of their convictions behind their vote. 
158
 The roots of this practice go to the arbitration agreements of the Hague Conference of 1899; though no 
formal, written dissents were allowed by the agreement, as arbitrations were governed by majority vote, “it 
was felt justified that an arbitrator who was required to affix his signature to an instrument, of whose terms 
he disapproved, should be allowed to exonerate himself of responsibility by indicating his dissent….”  R.P. 
Anand, The Role of Individual and Dissenting Opinions in International Adjudication, 14 INT’L & COMP. 
L.Q. 788, 795 (1965).  
159
 Judge Bernard Loder, League of Nations, Doc. No. C, 166 M. 66, 1929, V at 52.  Cited in Id. at 792.
160 Id.
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responsibility of the judge as well as the integrity of the Court as an institution,” 
precluding “any charge of reliance on mere alignment of voting.”161
C. CONCLUSION: TOWARDS A NEW PARADIGM? 
Recent moves away from strict nationality requirements for international judges 
suggest that it is possible to imagine an international justice system fundamentally 
divorced of nationality.  However, in this regard, it is clear that international law is 
bifurcated: States and other parties have been much more willing to give up citizenship 
requirements for judges when they are parties in private international legal fora, than 
when they appear before public international fora.  Much as at the beginning of State 
involvement in arbitration following the Jay Treaty, the interplay between commercial 
methodology and political requirements is slowly changing the landscape.  However, in 
today’s world, it is the commercial that is coming to trump the political.    
It is not surprising that the demise of nationality would be first seen in the 
commercial world.  Private international law has set the pace for legal globalization writ-
large and for international corporate actors such adjudication has a centuries-long history 
(see above).  Such practices intensified following World War II and the establishment of 
the Bretton Woods organizations; since then commercial actors (and various 
governmental agencies) have subscribed to a broad array of restrictive policies—
complete with sanctions—regulating activities.162  Moreover, since the passage of the 
161 HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE INTERNATIONAL COURT
68-69 (1958). Cited in Id.
162
 Controls on setting up cartels, and other anti-competitive measures have been key aspects of these 
restrictions.  See Joel I. Klein, Address at Fordham Corporate Law Institute 26th Annual Conference on 
Internatioanl Antitrust Law & Policy (Oct. 14, 1999), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/3747.pdf.
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New York Convention in 1958 recognizing the domestic enforcement of foreign arbitral 
awards,163 governments and private investors have increasingly employed various, non-
State-based dispute settlement systems in their disagreements.164  When appointing 
arbitrators, litigants have chosen to best serve their corporate interests, which have 
increasingly not necessarily corresponded with any particular nationality.165  For many of 
the reasons suggested above, the determinant-power of “nationality” has been replaced by 
reference to an individual’s educational, professional and/or economic backgrounds as 
markers used by appointing powers interested in protecting their interests.166
While all arbitral systems tend to treat nationality lightly, and indeed the 
international arbitration system as a whole has come to frown on the partisan, party-
appointed arbitrator,167 the most significant departure from a judicial nationality 
requirement has come in the dispute resolution process of the WTO.  Article 8§3 of the 
WTO’s Annex Governing the Settlement of Disputes states that “Citizens of Members 
163 CONVENTION AND THE RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN ARBITRAL AWARDS  (available 
at: http://www.uncitral.org/english/texts/arbitration/NY-conv.htm  (last visited Nov 2, 2004)).
164
 Key among these systems are the rules followed by the International Center for the Settlement of 
Investor Disputes (ICSID), the International Chamber of Commerce, UNCITRAL, the American 
Arbitration Association, the London Court of International Arbitration and the Stockholm Chamber.  For 
examples of these rules, see, for ICSID, Convention for the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between 
States and Nationals of Other States, Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 and 
http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/; for the Stockholm Chamber, http://www.chamber.se/arbitration/english/; 
and for the London Court of International Arbitration, http://www.lcia-arbitration.com/ (last visited all sites 
Nov 1, 2004).
165 Eg. in ICSID Case No. ARB/02/12 between the State of Jordan and a British engineering firm, the 
parties agreed on a German, an Italian and an Australian arbitrator; in Case ARB/01/13 between the State 
of Pakistan and a Swiss inspection/verification firm, the two sides chose a Filipino, Belgian and Canadian 
as arbitrators.  See ICSID-List of Concluded Cases at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/conclude.htm 
(last visited Nov 3, 2004).
166
 Such factors can include “tangible” and “intangible” elements, “including industry expertise, legal 
training, prior arbitration experience, [arbitration]…training, and demeanor.”  James E. Meason and Alison 
G. Smith, Current Issues in International Commercial Arbitration: Non-Lawyers in International 
Commercial Arbitration: Gathering Splinters on the Bench, 12 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 24, 33 (1991).   
167
 Robert H. Smit, General Commentary on the WIPO Arbitration Rules, Recommended Clauses, General 
Provisions and the WIPO Expedited Arbitration Rules: Articles 1 to 5; Articles 39 and 40, 9 AM. REV. 
INT’L ARB. Note 29 3 (1998).
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whose government…parties to the dispute or third parties shall not serve on a panel 
concerned with that dispute…”168
International law outside the commercial realm has been much slower to embrace
such “borderless” globalization, and a wider “non-State” world.  The insistence on 
maintaining national judges in public international fora is a key element of this reticence.  
There are two basic distinctions between the public law, and the private legal systems 
that are germane to this residual judicial nationalism, shedding light on how States have 
managed to protect this prerogative.  Both speak to the contention that the prime reason 
States demand and receive such representation in their public international disputes is 
because they can,169 and the public system—unlike significant aspects of the private 
international system—would not function without active State participation.  
The first distinction relates to enforcement.  While enforcement of arbitration 
awards by States is naturally welcome, most commercial arbitral tribunals deal with 
matters for which markets will provide effective enforcement of judgments, even if States 
or other parties attempt to subvert decisions.170  Public international law does not have 
the luxury of such ultra vires enforcement.  Public law tribunals must rely on the world 
community to construct and enforce their rulings.  For example, for the ICC, States must 
not only fund its operations, but must agree to allow the prosecutor to investigate and 
168
 Vagts, supra note 3, 257.
169 Supra note 23.
170
 If a party ignores decisions they do so at the risk inter alia of their credit rating, controlled by non-
governmental ratings institutions Moody’s, Fitch and Standard & Poors’.  Maintaining a high rating is 
critical to corporations and countries alike.  The power of these agencies in determining a country’s 
fortunes, and the independence with which they can do so, is substantial.  See Is There Accountability to 
Moody’s Moods? EMERGING MARKETS DATAFILE (1998); Rating the Agencies, FINANCIAL TIMES (London) 
25 (1998); Lawrence J. White, Bond-Raters’ Troika, 112 US BANKER 58 (2002); Moody’s Makes Up Little 
for Poor Standards, FINANCIAL EXPRESS (India) (2003); Chee Yoke Heong, Rating Agencies Under Fire 
from Crisis-Hit Nations, IPS-INTER PRESS SERVICE (1999).
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pursue leads on their territories, provide physical resources to build cases, and facilities 
for the convicted to serve out their sentences.
The non-State based discipline under which private international law works 
relates to the second distinction: jurisdiction.  The nature of “inviolable” Westphalian 
sovereignty differs greatly between private and public international law.  In the private 
context, the same forces that provide for enforcement of decisions demand jurisdiction 
over private law matters.  States have little choice but to accede, facing severe financial 
risks if they choose to reject jurisdiction—to do so would be to essentially opt for 
financial isolation.  Consequently, States have by-and-large “volunteered” to enter into
arbitral agreements.171  State players in the public international legal realm do not seem to 
suffer such great harms if they choose to withhold jurisdiction to transnational legal 
bodies.  This choice to withhold jurisdiction can be seen as directly descendant from 
commercial arbitration, in which jurisdiction has historically been at least nominally 
consensual.  With little penalty, States have withdrawn jurisdiction—or heavily cabined 
their acceptance of it—to bodies such as the ICJ.  Even the ad hoc UN tribunals in 
Rwanda and the former-Yugoslavia, created under the UN”s binding Chapter VII 
authority, have seen only meek support from many UN States.172  Consequently, the 
irony of public international law and commercial arbitration is that while the latter had 
long been thought based on jurisdiction via agreement of the parties, and the former—in 
line with legal proceedings—was thought to have a more mandatory jurisdiction, the 
171
 This voluntary component is a key distinction of arbitral systems.  See Emerson, supra note 18, at 157. 
172
 UN Security Council Presidential Statement, Aug 4, 2004.  UN Doc S/PRST/2004/28.
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changing nature of global commerce and the declining power of States in financial 
matters, has produced the opposite reality.173
Despite the diluted incentives for States to forego judicial nationalism in the 
public law realm, at the margins it seems that here too they are slowly coming to realize 
the weakness of relying on nationality as an indicator of allegiance, and have begun 
looking to other factors to best protect their interests at international tribunals.  Such 
realizations are occurring most apparently in regional international courts.  For instance, 
the American judge on the ICJ, Thomas Buergenthal, previously served on the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights, a position for which he was nominated by Costa 
Rica.174  Interestingly, at no point in his tenure was he viewed by his Costa Rican 
nominators as having harmed Costa Rican interests due to an “American” judicial 
perspective.  Nor was he branded anti-American for accepting the nomination of a 
foreign State—indeed, he was subsequently appointed by the United States as the 
American judge at the ICJ.  A similar, still nascent court, the African Court of on Human 
and People’s Rights, has gone even further, holding that if “[a]… judge is a national of 
any State, which is a party to a case, submitted to the Court, that judge shall not hear the 
173 As more commercial arbitration is engaged in, the power of States will likely decrease even further in 
international law, if only do to source of power had by commercial arbitrators, compared with national 
judges.  “Unlike the national judge, the arbitrator’s authority does not derive from -- nor is his ultimate 
responsibility to -- the State.…[His] authority derives, at least in first instance, from party agreement and 
his ultimate responsibility is not to a State but to the parties.”  Mehren, supra note 14, at 1057.
174
 The statute of that Court only allows State parties to the Court to nominate candidates for the bench; 
only 19 States have ratified the statute, the U.S. not among them.   However, despite the limited nominating 
pool, the requirement for potential judges is that they be nationals of any Organization of American States 
member, a much larger pool of 35 States including the U.S. See CHARTER OF THE ORGANIZATION OF 
AMERICAN STATES (available at: http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/charter.html) and STATUTE OF THE 
INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS (available at: 
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/oasinstr/zoas6cts.htm);  (last visited both sites Nov 1, 2004).
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case.”175  The nationality requirement may also be breaking down in quasi-judicial 
bodies.  For example, the United States has recently nominated two non-Americans to be 
Special Rapporteurs to the UN Human Rights Commission.176  It is important to note that 
none of these changes suggest that nationality, per se, is becoming less important for 
States; rather, they suggest that certain pressures are forcing States to give up this once 
inviolable requirement for their appointees.      
At first blush, change within the ICJ also seems to be occurring; however, a closer 
analysis of the reforms reveals that they were catalyzed by a desire to further, rather than 
diminish, the role and power of nationality.  For example, the requirement that an ad hoc 
judge be a national of the appointing State has been disbanded.177  However, rather than 
an acknowledgement of national partiality, the rule change was instigated by small States, 
which could not always find a suitable national to sit.178  Moreover, Schwebel points to 
several cases in which no national party had a member on the court, and where neither 
party in a case chose to appoint ad hoc judges.179  Yet, these choices, and the even rarer 
case where one party chooses to appoint an ad hoc judge and the opposing party chooses 
neither an ad hoc judge nor has a co-national on the bench,180 have been anomalous. 181
175 PROTOCOL TO THE AFRICAN CHARTER ON HUMAN AND PEOPLE’S RIGHTS ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN 
AFRICAN COURT ON HUMAN AND PEOPLE’S RIGHTS, art. 11(1), art. 22,  June 9, 1998, OAU Doc. 
OAU/LEG/EXP/AFCHPR/PROT (III).
176
 Information provided to author; US Representative to UN Offices in Geneva.  July, 2004.
177
 Schwebel supra note 42, at 896.
178
 Schwebel notes that “about half of the 60-odd judges ad hoc of the ICJ have not been of the nationality 
of the appointing States.”  Id., at. 897.
179 Id. at 897.  Schwebel mentions cases including Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru, Temple of Preah 
Vihear and Sovereignty over Certain Frontier Land.
180 Id. This was the position of Portugal in its case against Yugoslavia in Legality of the Use of Force.
181
 It is interesting to note that while it remains unusual for a State to agree to not have one of its own on the 
bench, by reference to the nationality of the counsel chosen by States to appear on their behalf, it is evident 
that litigants do not find nationality important in the presentation of their cases.  Yet, here too, the rationale 
for choosing specific counsel may not stem from any reduced attachment to nationality; rather, certain 
professors/specialists of international law have consistently appeared before the Court, becoming counsel 
of choice not due to their nationality, but rather their intimacy with the judges and Court procedures.  For 
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The cosmetic nature of any ICJ reforms suggests that the public international 
judiciary, at least at the ICJ, if not in most other similar fora, will likely remain mired in 
increasingly dubious questions of nationality, citizenship and consequent doubts about 
judicial “independence.”  Rather than a quaint anachronism, this concentration may 
hinder the growth and application of transnational adjudication182—concerns about 
biased, politicized judges have been raised in ICTY and ICTR proceedings, have 
provided fodder for critics of the ICC,183 and have also recently been arrayed anew 
against the ICJ, from both within and outside the institution.184  As international judicial 
bodies continue to proliferate185 this concern is likely to increase, bringing with it a 
potential to retard the development of international law.  
instance, as of this writing Australian James Crawford has been counsel in sixteen cases before the ICJ, 
representing States as varied as Nauru, Libya and Croatia.  Notably, he has been counsel both for some 
States in certain cases, and against the same States in other proceedings.  Other prolific ICJ counsel who 
have also represented motley States include Ian Brownlie, Christopher Greenwood and Alain Pellet.  The 
same lack of concern for nationality also permeates the selection of ad hoc judges; it is not uncommon for 
States to pick judges who either have served previously on the Court, or are otherwise well-known to the 
Court, regardless judges’ nationalities.
182
 “The questionable…impartiality of the judges [undoubtedly] weakens the Court [and international law 
writ large].”  Tiefenbrun, supra note 139, at 23.  Moreover, it is apparent that a “tribunal which satisfies the 
political instincts and reflects the political deals of the members, but is not the kind of court to which they 
would entrust the settlement of their disputes, is…of no use to anybody.”  Gross, supra note 63, at 289.  
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However, despite the benefits that may accrue from greater judicial independence, 
proponents of removing nationality are stuck in a contradiction.  Increasing judicial 
independence may seem a valiant goal, but it is not clear that further increasing judicial 
autonomy on the ICJ or in other public international institutions would be as beneficial as 
hoped.  Not only do the data analyzed above provide only meek support for the benefits 
of doing so, but State players remain by-and-large attached to such nationalism, fighting 
for “their” nations to be represented on international judicial bodies.186  Demanding a 
removal of State identification for judges could strip the ICJ of significant legitimacy in 
the eyes of many of its State supporters.   
Moreover, it is not certain what such a reform would do to the provision of 
“justice” as envisioned by the framers of the ICJ.  After all, the ICJ statute calls for
judges to represent the “principal legal systems”187 of the world, a goal that has been 
implemented with judges from a diverse set of fifteen States.  Though it is already 
questionable whether their diverse nationalities reflect true diversity, eliminating 
nationality requirements—the extreme result of demanding such autonomy—may 
actually lead to an even greater degree of judicial homogenization than at present.  
Further, there remain good practical reasons to keep nationality as a factor in judicial 
nominations; doing so provides some psychic “ownership” to States in the ICJ process 
and can potentially promote compliance with Court decisions.  
As Oscar Schachter notes:
COURT OF JUSTICE 280-323 (1997); Robert Jennings, The Role of the International Court of Justice in the 
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“the fact that judges often reflect particular State interests is of 
course at variance with the ideal of objectivity of the judicial function. Yet 
it is not unreasonable to regard the reflection of national or group interests 
as appropriate and advantageous for an international court in a divided and 
heterogeneous world.”188
Consequently, it may be possible to make ICJ judges more independent, but based 
on the voting records examined above it is unclear that doing so is entirely necessary.  
Moreover, it remains dubious whether the ICJ could survive if a demand was made to 
take nationality out of the judicial calculus, 189 or that doing so would be beneficial either 
to the court itself or to the development of international law and the provision of global 
“justice.”  However, as private international law continues to expand, and arguably 
comes to subvert public international law,190 the ICJ and similar institutions may be 
forced to re-assess their age-old attachments to judicial nationalism.
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